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The goal of this thesis is to determine the best way to manage the Flying Hour
Program (FHP) from the perspective of the U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic
(MARFORLANT) Aviation Budget Officer. The thesis has two main objectives. The
first objective is to describe the organization and current financial management issues
related to the FHP at the Department of the Navy (DON) and MARFORLANT levels.
An historical overview of the FHP, an analysis of federal and defense budgeting
dynamics, and an impact analysis of the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan are provided.
The second objective is to conduct quantitative analysis of selected MARFORLANT data
to better understand FHP cost behavior. Regression results are compared with previous
DON research to determine the suitability of Cost Per Hour as the most reliable FHP
metric. Analysis confirmed that there is a direct relationship between fuel and flight
hours, but showed virtually no correlation between flight hours and aviation maintenance
costs. These findings indicate that regression models show too much variability for them
to be used to displace the DON OP-20 model as the primary means for budget forecasting
for the FHP. The thesis concludes that the Aviation Budget Officer must continue to rely





A. AVIATION AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET 1
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 2
C. SCOPE 4
D. METHODOLOGY 4
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 5
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, DEFENSE BUDGETING, THE OP-20, AND
LITERATURE REVIEW 7
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 7
B. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DYNAMICS AFFECTING THE FHP 8
C. THE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM AND PPBS 9
1. N-88 and Flying Hour Program Budget Formulation 12
D. THE USE OF FINANCIAL MODELS AND THE FLYING HOUR
PROGRAM 13
1. Major OP-20 Flight Hour Categories 14
2. OP-20 Back-Up Exhibits 14
3. The TACAIR OP-20 Model 15
4. The Fleet Air Training Model 17
5. Other OP-20 Sections 18
6. OP-20 Breakdown of Cost Per Hour and Total Budgeted Cost 1
8
E. PREDICTION OF COSTS IN THE OP-20 MODEL 20
F. KEY CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS FHP RESEARCH 21
1
.
Previous Quantitative Analysis of the Flying Hour Program 21
2. Previous Qualitative Analysis of the Flying Hour Program 24
vii
3. A Framework for Analysis of FHP as a Management
Control System 25
G. SUMMARY 28
III. MARINE AVIATION, MACP AND MARFORLANT 29
A. ORGANIZATION OF MARINE AVIATION AT MARFORLANT 29
B. THE MARFORLANT AVIATION BUDGET OFFICER 35
C. MARINE AVIATION AND THE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM 36
D. FHP PROBLEMS WHICH THREATEN MARFORLANT
FUNDING 38
1. Failure of OP-20 to Accurately Predict Costs 39
2. Peace Dividend Raiding ofO&M Dollars 39
3
.
Aging Aircraft and Diminished Procurement Funding 40
4. Failure of Equipment to Meet Life-Cycle Goals 40
5. Problems with Navy Working Capital Funds •. 41
6. Operational Tempo 41
E. THE MARINE AVIATION CAMPAIGN PLAN 42
F. SUMMARY 45
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PRESENTATION OF DATA 47
A. INTRODUCTION 47
B. COST ESTIMATION USING PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS 47
1. Fundamentals of Linear Regression 48
2. Time-Series Analysis and Lagged Regression 54
C. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 56
D. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 60
E. PRESENTATION OF QUANTITATIVE DATA 60
1 AIRLANT Flying Hour Cost Reports 60
viii
2. 2
nd MAW Cost Data 61
3. Adjustment of Cost Data 61
V. ANALYSIS 69
A. INTRODUCTION 69
B. REGRESSION RESULTS 69
1. Regression Results and the Null Hypotheses 70
2. Regression Results and Aggregate Annual Data by FHP
Category 70
3. Regression Results by Aircraft Type 71
4. Interpretation of the Results by Cost Pool 72
5. Implications for the Aviation Budget Officer and the FHP 75
C. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES OF FHP DATA 76
D. OPTIONS FOR FORECASTING FUTURE COSTS 79
E. ANALYSIS OF FHP AS A MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM 81
F. SUMMARY 85
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 87
A. SUMMARY OF SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 87
1
.
What are the historical trends of flying hour program budgeting
and execution? 87
2. How has the switch from flying hour based budgeting to event
based budgeting affected Marine Aviation at MARFORLANT7..88
3 What are the budgeting dynamics that currently threaten full
funding ofMARFORLANT's aviation program? 88
4. What is the financial condition of the MARFORLANT
Aviation program compared with MARFORPAC, and if there
is a difference, what explains the differences? 89
IX
5. Can new financial models be developed to more accurately
capture the realities ofMARFORLANT aviation? 89
6. Can simulation be used to test the accuracy of current and
alternative aviation cost models at MARFORLANT? 90
7. What future budgeting and operating adjustments does
MARFORLANT need to make to successfully meet the goals
of the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan? 90
B. SUMMARY OF THE PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 90
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 92
D. CONCLUSION 92
APPENDIX A. MARFORLANT DISTRIBUTION OF NAVY O&M
FUNDS 93
APPENDIX B. COMPREHENSIVE COST AND FLIGHT HOUR DATA 95
APPENDIX C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS TABLES 105
LIST OF REFERENCES 109
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 115
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1. Department of Defense Budget Trends 10
Figure 2.2. R2 by Aircraft Type at Pacific Missile Test Center [Ref. 22] 22
Figure 2.3. Averaged Regression Results for Reserve F/A-18s [Ref. 27] 22
Figure 2.4. Controlling Business Strategy: Key Variables To Be Analyzed 27
Figure 3.1. U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic with the Structure of the Unified
Commands 29
Figure 3.2. Different Command Responsibilities Held by Commander, U.S. Marine
Forces Atlantic 31
Figure 3.3. Major Subordinate Organizations ofMARFORLANT [Ref. 49] 32
Figure 3.4. DOD FHP Financial Organization and Flow of Blue Dollars [Ref. 51]. ...34
Figure 3.5. Breakdown of Operational Target Functional Categories at
MARFORLANT [Ref. 52] 35
Figure 3.6. Comparison ofFY 98 Aviation Funding Between MARFORLANT ACE
and COMNAVAIRLANT (in millions) 38
Figure 3.7. FY98 Blue vs. Green Dollars at MARFORLANT (in millions) 38
Figure 3.8. Increase in Overall Parts which are BCM-1 (Beyond Capability of
Maintenance-Repair Not Authorized) [Ref. 59] 40
Figure 3.9. Historical FHP Execution Data at 2nd MAW 42
Figure 3.10. Summary of the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan 43
Figure 4.1. Sample Regression Results from MINITAB 50
Figure 4.2. Aggregate Annual Cost Data from AIRLANT Flying Hour Cost
Reports 62
Figure 4.3. Monthly Cost Data by T/MS from 2nd MAW Database 63
Figure 4.4. Fuel Adjustment Index (Base Year 1998) [Ref. 85] 65
XI
Figure 4.5. Operations and Maintenance Price Adjustment Index (Base Year
1998) 66
Figure 4.6. VAD Price Adjustment Index (Base Year 1998) 66
Figure 4.7. Data Adjustment Matrix 67
Figure 5.1. Sample Regression Results Table 69
Figure 5.2. Regression Results by Organizational/Functional Category 70
Figure 5.3. Regression Results by Type 71
Figure 5.4. Comparison ofMARFORLANT TACAIR Cost Pools 76
Figure 5.5. MARFORLANT Historical Trends for Aircraft Authorized and Flight
Hours 77
Figure 5.6. MARFORPAC vs. MARFORPAC Cost Pool Comparison 78
Figure 5.7. MARFORPAC TACAIR Regression Results 79



































Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet
Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet
Aircraft Flight Operations
Aircrew Manning Factor
Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness Working Group
Aircraft Operations Maintenance
Aviation Depot Level Repairables






Defense Business Operations Fund
Depot Level Repairables or Aviation Depot Level
Repairables
The Department of Defense
The Department of the Navy Flying Hour Program
Flying Hour Program Projection System
Fleet Marine Force
Fiscal Year
Future Years Defense Program
Government Accounting Office
Hours flown per Month per Crew
Intermediate Maintenance Activity
Joint Task Force
Marine Aviation Campaign Plan
Marine Aircraft Group
Marine Air Ground Task Force
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron
U. S. Marine Forces Atlantic


































Mean Time Between Failures
Director, Naval Air Warfare
Director, Naval Inventory Control Point
Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures
Standardization
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Office of
Budget
Naval Supply Systems Command
Naval Center For Cost Analysis
Operating Target Functional Category
Organizational Maintenance Activity
Operational maneuver From the Sea
Office of Management and Budget





Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
Tactical and Anti-Submarine Warfare Aviation
Temporary Additional Duty
Aircraft Type Model Series
Transportation of Things
Training and Readiness Manual
United States Atlantic Command
Monthly Aircraft Utilization Rate
Working Capital Funds
Second Marine Aircraft Wing
xiv
I. INTRODUCTION
As critical as Marine Aviation is to "Operational Maneuver From the Sea"
(OMFTS), we need to ensure that when it comes time to fight, our aircraft,
our aviators, and those who support them are in the highest possible state
of readiness. [Ref. 1]
General Charles Krulak's direction summarizes the endstate he expects for Marine
Aviation. This thesis describes the key financial management dynamics and challenges
of accomplishing that endstate. In particular, it examines the Flying Hour Program (FHP)
at U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) from the perspective of
MARFORLANT's Aviation Budget Officer. This officer's principal duty is to
understand how to effectively manage "blue dollars" from the Flying Hour Program,
which allocates the majority of financial resources for Marine Aviation readiness.
A. AVIATION AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET
Most individuals associated with the Department of Defense are fully aware of the
budget struggles of the post cold war era. Each service annually faces difficult decisions
about the allocation of limited resources. For the United States Marine Corps and Marine
Aviation, this is not an unfamiliar problem. Consider the description of the Marine
Corps' health from a similar budget cutting era 50 years ago:
Cates (General Clifton B. Cates) Corps shrank to fit federal budgets rather
than expanding to fit contingency plans. Whereas Headquarters thought it
needed at least 1 1 4,200 Marines to meet its peacetime duties, its funded
manpower fell from 92,222 to 83,609 men in 1948 and dropped again to
74,279 by the spring of 1950. About 50,000 men were assigned to the
operating forces, but the FMF had only about 35,000 men in the two
divisions and aircraft wings, while nearly 15,000 men served in shore
security detachments and ships guards. The Corps supporting establish-
ment was so small and its tasks for maintaining Corps bases so extensive
that many FMF troops spent more time housekeeping than training. ...It
(the diminished budget) was not enough to buy adequate manpower,
training, or new equipment; the Marines lived on skeletonized units,
World War II surplus, and dwindling amounts of Navy amphibious
shipping of World War II vintage. [Ref. 2]
Although actual numbers are different, today's potential problems and trends are
the same. Decisions about budget resources involve issues about purchasing or
maintaining equipment, manning units, cutting or funding major programs, or even about
the very existence of military services. For the Marine Corps, this is the context that
should be remembered when considering the specific research question of aviation budget
management.
Ultimately, discussions about budgets and Marine Aviation are not just about the
readiness of the aircraft and pilots to execute their missions. Budget discussions carry the
implications of whether the Marine Corps can truly execute its mission. Whether the
discussion involves using helicopters or tilt rotor aircraft for aerial envelopments, or is
concerned about close air support in conjunction with an attack by a ground combat
element, aviation is essential to the Marine Corps' existence. As Marine leaders so often
state, without the A in aviation there is no MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force), and
the Marine Corps becomes just another light infantry unit.
To keep Marine aircraft units adequately funded, the Marine Corps depends upon
the effective administration of appropriations through the Department of the Navy's
Flying Hour Program. The Flying Hour Program is the Navy and Marine Corps'
principle prograrnming and budgeting mechanism for financing the operational and
logistical readiness of aviation squadrons. Like the state of Marine Corps resources 50
years ago, today's Marine Corps leaders and staff still fight to keep Marine Aviation fully
funded because of three general factors: the continuous reduction of available federal
funds, the post-Cold War drawdown, and an increasing operational tempo. In its attempts
to prevent [Marine and] Naval Aviation from becoming a "skeleton force," the
Department of the Navy has attempted to improve its understanding of the cost dynamics
inherent in budgeting by flight hours. However, the Marine Corps has taken an
additional step by trying to reduce their operational tempo and improve their logistical
health through a management strategy called the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan
(MACP). First published in 1996, the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan is a comprehen-
sive program to better balance all aviation goals within the constraints of existing
resources.
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
With today's aviation challenges in mind, this thesis examines and analyzes the
dynamics of funding Marine Aviation at U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic. Research is
oriented towards outlining and understanding the financial management tasks and
obstacles faced by the MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer, who is the command's
primary manager of the Flying Hour Program.
Since MARFORLANT is an operational command primarily responsible for
Marine Aviation units that train and deploy from the east coast of the United States, the
Aviation Budget Officer's key task is to ensure that Flying Hour Program dollars are
properly allocated to subordinate units. Therefore, the primary research question of this
thesis is: How should the Marine Corps Flying Hour Program at Marine Forces
Atlantic be managed in order to maximize its value to MARFORLANT Aviation?
To answer that question, research efforts are broken down into two objectives.
The first objective is to gain an understanding of the Flying Hour Program as viewed by
both the Department of the Navy and MARFORLANT. This includes a historical
overview of the Flying Hour Program at the Department of the Navy level, the impact of
MARFORLANT organization on the Flying Hour Program, an overview of the Marine
Aviation Campaign Plan, and a survey of financial management levers of control
available to the MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer. The second objective is to
conduct deductive cost analysis similar to work performed in previous research, and
analysis of the FHP at MARFORLANT as a management control system. A comparison
of findings between MARFORLANT and previous research at other levels can help
indicate whether the conclusions about FHP cost behavior and FHP management from
previous research can be applied at MARFORLANT.
To summarize the primary and secondary research questions are:
Primary Question:
1. How should the Marine Corps Flying Hour Program at Marine Forces
Atlantic be managed in order to maximize its value to MARFORLANT
Aviation?
Secondary Questions:
1. What are the historical trends of flying hour program budgeting and
execution at MARFORLANT?
2. How has the switch from flying hour based budgeting to event based
budgeting affected Marine aviation at MARFORLANT?
3. What are the budgeting dynamics that currently threaten full funding of
MARFORLANT' s aviation programs?
4. What is the financial condition of the MARFORLANT aviation program
compared with MARFORPAC, and if there is a difference, what explains
the differences?
5. Can new financial models be developed to more accurately capture the
realities ofMARFORLANT aviation?
6. Can simulation be used to test the accuracy of current and alternative
aviation cost models at MARFORLANT?
7. What future budgeting and operating adjustments does MARFORLANT
need to make in order to successfully meet the goals of the Marine
Aviation Campaign Plan?
C. SCOPE
Several Naval Postgraduate School Theses about the Flying Hour Program have
been written over the past 1 3 years. However, most analyzed the Flying Hour Program
from a macro level such as the Department of the Navy or from the perspective of a major
claimant such as Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific. This research narrows its focus
specifically to MARFORLANT and its subordinates units, except where an examination
of factors from a higher echelon is essential to the research. Therefore the analysis and
conclusions focus not on reinventing the Flying Hour Program, but on understanding the
FHP's current condition. In addition, the majority of the analysis is focused on the
TACAIR component of the FHP, because the majority of appropriated funds go to pay
for TACAIR costs.
D. METHODOLOGY
Two approaches will be used to study these problems. Archival research briefly
develops the background of the Flying Hour Program at the Department of the Navy
level, then focuses on the dynamics of Marine Aviation and the FHP at MARFORLANT.
Secondly, both quantitative and qualitative analyses examine MARFORLANT cost
behavior and budgeting actions. Regression analysis is the primary quantitative method
used. Qualitative analysis uses Robert Simons' framework on management control
systems [Ref. 3] as a framework to discuss the FHP budgeting process and the Marine
Aviation Campaign Plan. The analysis of cost behavior is deductively compared to
research hypotheses developed from previous research. Cost data is analyzed to see
whether the assumptions inherent in the Flying Hour Program are actually reflected in
cost behavior at 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing and subordinate Marine Aircraft Groups.
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Analytical conclusions about MARFORLANT FHP cost behavior and the budgeting
dynamics of the FHP are used to answer the primary and secondary research questions.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into six chapters.
Chapter I is the introduction and gives a large scale background about the
importance of studying Marine Aviation and the Flying Hour Program. It states research
objectives, research questions, the scope of the research, and its overall methodology.
Chapter II outlines background essential towards understanding the conceptual
framework of the thesis. Included in this is a brief background description of Federal
budgeting and PPBS dynamics, a description of the OP-20 model, the search for
alternative parametric costing models, and an introduction to Simon's theory on
management control systems.
Chapter III provides background beginning with the Marine Corps' interaction
with the Flying Hour Program, the importance of Marine Aviation to the MAGTF
concept, and problems facing Marine Aviation in the 90 's. In addition, it surveys the
organization of MARFORLANT for aviation and how MARFORLANT plugs into the
Flying Hour Program and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. (PPBS)
Chapter IV establishes the techniques used for both quantitative and qualitative
research in the thesis and then presents the collected cost data. First, parametric analysis
using regression techniques is discussed. Secondly, qualitative analysis using the
conceptual framework of Simons is explained. The method used to adjust cost data is
discussed. Finally, cost data is presented. This data includes monthly obligation costs
from 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, and annual MARFORLANT costs extracted from
Commander Naval Air Force, Atlantic cost reports.
Chapter V is the analysis of cost data, and a discussion of budgeting dynamics
within the framework of Simons', Levers of Control . The results of regression analysis
are presented and interpreted. In addition, other relevant comparisons of cost data are
presented. Qualitative analysis primarily discusses the impact of Department of the Navy
budgeting, the FHP, and the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan on MARFORLANT
Aviation.
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the answers to the primary and secondary
research questions, and offers suggestions for future research.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, DEFENSE BUDGETING, THE OP-20,
AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter addresses background material essential to understanding the theore-
tical framework of the rest of the thesis. It begins with a brief summary of relevant facts
about federal budgeting and DOD's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.
Next, the chapter describes the basic Flying Hour Program model for predicting flight
hours and cost. Finally, important previous research relevant to the thesis is summarized.
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Department of the Navy has used the flight hour as a common metric to
budget for aviation programs for nearly 30 years. Using the flight hour as a common
metric means that nearly all FHP cost requirements are stated in a "Cost Per Hour" (CPH)
format. (E.g., COST/HOURS FLOWN = COST PER HOUR). The simplicity of this
relationship immediately leads to misperceptions and assumptions that can cause
problems in understanding the Flying Hour Program. Two common misperceptions
about Cost-Flight Hour are listed below.
1
.
Flight hours statistically correlate closely to cost. Therefore, an accurate
prediction of total flight hours should yield an accurate prediction of total
cost. Flight costs vary directly with the number of hours flown.
2. Flying Hour Program budgets can be easily adjusted simply by multiply-
ing the current cost per hour by the number of flight hours to determine
the amount of dollars that should be added or subtracted from unit
budgets.
These misperceptions have lead to three prevailing problems with the Flying Hour
Program and the OP-20 as a predictive financial model:
1 The Flying Hour Program frequently does not accurately forecast program
costs.
2. The Flying Hour Program frequently does not regularly meet its budgeted
flight hour goals.
3. The Flying Hour Program has been unable to demonstrate statistically that
flying a predetermined percentage of required flight hours correlates to a
pre-determined level of readiness.
Previous research and investigative reports over the past 30 years have repeatedly
identified these problems. In addition, several attempts have been made to build a better
predictive model by either determining a linear relationship between cost and flight hours
or by searching for other metrics that might correlate to Naval Aviation costs.
Since this thesis examines the Flying Hour Program at MARFORLANT from
both a quantitative and qualitative perspective, this chapter reviews the basic structure of
the OP-20, the basic mathematical model the Flying Hour Program uses for aviation
budgeting. The term OP-20 refers to the name of the budget exhibit that annually
displays cost and flight hour budget predictions for the Flying Hour Program. Under-
standing the structure of the predictive models in the OP-20 is essential to comprehending
the budgeting dynamics analyzed in this and previous Flying Hour Program research
efforts. With a clear understanding of the OP-20, key conclusions from previous research
efforts may be used as deductive benchmarks for data analysis, and for developing
conclusions about the Flying Hour Program at MARFORLANT.
B. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DYNAMICS AFFECTING THE FHP
A brief analysis of the environment in which defense budgets are formulated
provides insight into the processes and problems of the Flying Hour Program. This is
essential because the sheer size and problems of the federal budget dwarf any single part
of the Defense Department program such as the FHP. An analysis without a perspective
on the workings of Congress, the federal budget and PPBS will yield useless conclusions,
i.e., that the government should simply "invest more money" in the Flying Hour Program
to fix its problems.
Despite the budget cuts, tax increases, and revenue increases that led to the FY98
federal budget surplus of 71 billion dollars [Ref. 4], the federal government had 29
straight years of budget deficits (FY1968-FY1997), that have accumulated into a public
debt of over 5.5 Trillion dollars. [Ref. 5] Even more sobering is the admission by the
Congressional Budget Office that "At this point, there is little firm information about the
sources of income that produced the added revenues in 1998 and their implications for the
revenue growth in future years." [Ref. 6] Although these trends have made budget
forecasts for the next 10 years positive, the nation faces the chance that conditions may
adversely change in future years. As the Congressional Budget Office noted, "the budget
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outlook can improve or deteriorate rapidly, in part because changes in the fiscal position
of the government tend to feed on themselves, producing larger changes in the same
direction... a reversal of those changes could initiate a vicious cycle—with increasing
debt and increasing interest costs—that could eliminate the projected surpluses." [Ref. 7]
Additionally, without the help of revenues from Social Security and the U.S. Postal
Service, the federal budget still had a deficit of 28 billion dollars in FY98. [Ref. 8] So,
despite the "peace dividend" of the 1 990s and the strong economy, Congress is not in a
position to appropriate new spending to plus up many Department of Defense programs.
The Department of Defense also faces common misperceptions about the source
of budget deficits and the resulting public debt. The defense budget requested by the
President for FY 1999 is about 40 percent below its 1985 peak. [Ref. 9] Yet, since it is
still the largest discretionary spending program, it remains political prey for members of
Congress searching for budget cuts. Despite the fact that in 1998 mandatory spending
and the cost of interest on the debt was 66 percent of Federal spending, the political
unpopularity of entitlement cuts makes it easy for legislators to give in to the common
public misperception that defense spending causes the public debt. [Ref. 10] Figure 2.1
documents that regardless of the measure used, the defense budget is the smallest it has
been in real dollars in 40 years.
In Fiscal Year 1998, the sum of Department of the Navy Operations and
Maintenance appropriations for the Flying Hour Program was 3.2 billion dollars for both
active and reserve forces. [Ref. 11] This is 1.2 percent of the DOD budget and 3.8
percent of the Department of the Navy budget. [Ref. 12] Citing these figures is not
intended to trivialize the hundreds of millions of dollars administered through the Flying
Hour Program. Nevertheless, they emphasize that the Flying Hour Program competes
with other programs on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon for limited funding annually in
highly complex and political budget battles.
C. THE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM AND PPBS
The annual budget battle for limited resources begins long before a President's
Budget is submitted to Congress. The decisions that determine which programs are
funded and how much they receive comes through repetitive cycles of the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). Very broadly, PPBS is the Department of
Defense system that allocates financial resources to meet perceived military threats to
national security in both immediate and future budget years. In other words, the
complexity of budgeting for the Flying Hour Program is not limited simply to the next
budget year, but also includes the following five budget years at a minimum.
In the Planning phase, an iterative process occurs when the national security
council, the Joint Staff, the Service Chiefs and the Commanders in Chief (CinC) of the
Spending % of Federal Outlays % of Net Public
Spending
% of GDP
Fiscal Year DOD Non-DOD DOD DOD
1950 27.4 72.6 18.5 4.3
1955 51.4 48.6 35.5 8.9
1960 45.0 55.0 30.3 8.0
1965 38.8 61.2 25.2 6.7
1970 39.4 60.6 25.4 7.6
1971 35.4 64.6 22.4 6.9
1972 32.5 67.5 20.6 6.4
1973 29.8 70.2 19.0 5.6
1974 28.8 71.2 18.2 5.4
1975 25.5 74.5 16.5 5.5
1976 23.6 76.4 15.4 5.1
1977 23.4 76.6 15.5 4.8
1978 22.5 77.5 15.2 4.7
1979 22.8 77.2 15.4 4.6
1980 22.5 77.5 15.3 4.9
1981 23.0 77.0 15.8 5.1
1982 24.7 75.3 16.9 5.7
1983 25.4 74.6 17.3 6.0
1984 25.9 74.1 17.5 5.8
1985 25.9 74.1 17.6 6.0
1986 26.8 73.2 17.9 6.1
1987 27.3 72.7 17.6 6.0
1988 26.5 73.5 17.0 5.7
1989 25.8 74.2 16.5 5.5
1990 23.1 76.9 14.8 5.1
1991 19.8 80.2 12.6 4.5
1992 20.0 80.0 13.1 4.7
1993 19.8 80.2 12.4 4.3
1994 19.8 80.2 11.6 3.9
1995 17.2 82.8 10.8 3.6
1996 16.2 83.8 10.1 3.4
1997 16.1 83.9 9.3 3.2
1998 15.1 84.9 9.0 3.0
1999 14.6 85.4 8.9 2.9
Figure 2.1. Department of Defense Budget Trends
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nation's unified and functional commands determine the best way to accomplish and
enact a military strategy that responds to threats to U.S. national interests. The Defense
Resource Board's programming priorities, requirements and advice are passed onto the
Secretary of Defense, who, with the help of his Comptroller, other staff, and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) decide how best to match resources to priorities.
Ultimately, the Defense Secretary's "Defense Planning Guidance" is produced which
gives a broad picture by functional category of how fiscal resources should be focused to
respond to threats. This is accompanied by the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) which
is a detailed data base showing resource allocation that not only cover the upcoming two
fiscal years to be approved by Congress, but also a tentative plan for future spending for
four additional years.
In the Programming phase, the CINCs, Service Chiefs, and Resource Sponsors try
to best answer the question: "How much defense can we afford," by submitting
conceptual plans which attempt to look for the best and most cost efficient ways to
allocate resources, and the optimal way to structure our military forces to accomplish the
national military strategy. The Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) is each
services' plan to accomplish this. The finished product is capped by the Secretary of
Defense's Program Decision Memorandum which approves the POM with exceptions. In
the case of the Flying Hour Program, broad questions are considered such as how much
to fly, how many aircraft should be authorized, and what structure should future Naval
Aviation forces possess. All are debated within the confines of trying to meet the goals
of the National Military Strategy and the Defense Planning Guidance.
Once the POM has been developed and approved, the Budgeting Phase of PPBS
begins. In the case of the Flying Hour Program, this is where Resource Sponsors such as
Commander Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), the Commander Naval Supply
Command (NAVSUP), and major claimants such as Naval Air Forces Atlantic
(AIRLANT) and Naval Air Forces Pacific (AIRPAC), and must determine their inputs to
the Budget Estimate Submission, a detailed budgeting plan for the Flying Hour Program.
This budget quantifies questions such as how many hours will be flown and what costs
will be projected. In addition, the Resource Sponsor must gain approval from the
Department of the Navy Office of the Comptroller, which must in turn gain approval for
the Secretary of the Navy's budget from the Secretary of Defense and his Comptroller.
Ultimately, once the budget is approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President, it
is presented to Congress as part of the President's Budget. Despite the fact that staff at all
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levels in DOD have spent in excess of 15 months of effort to build the President's
Budget, this plan still must withstand the scrutiny and politics of the congressional
legislative process. Congress must eventually approve authorization and appropriation
bills for the President to sign into law. Only after the President signs the bills and funds
are apportioned by OMB, DOD and the Secretary of the Navy, can appropriations
actually be spent in the interests of the Flying Hour Program. [Ref. 13]
This broad outline of the PPBS and congressional budgeting illustrates that the
Flying Hour Program is a small percentage of the overall DOD budget, painstakingly
developed through a time consuming process. These factors limit the ability of FHP
guardians to make significant changes in spending without considerable political clout.
In addition, the lengthiness of the process means that programmers must make decisions
about the Flying Hour Program in their POM submissions up to three years ahead of
when funding will be received. In that time, major strategic, logistical and economic
changes can and do occur. For example, during Fiscal Year 1998, while Congress
debated over the President's Fiscal Year 1999 budget, the Department of Defense spent
the majority of its effort producing the Program Objectives Memorandum for Fiscal Year
2000 and 2001, and in addition incorporated planning for Fiscal Years 2002 through
2005.
While the Flying Hour Program is exceedingly complex because of the total input
variables that produce its cost projections, planners, programmers and budgeteers must
also deal with variables of uncertainty unrelated even to congressional and Department of
Defense politics. These include the uncertainty related to national economic and national
security factors ranging from the health of the international economy, inflation rates,
government revenue collection, to emerging international security threats.
1. N-88 and Flying Hour Program Budget Formulation
Within the Department of the Navy, the billet with primary responsibility for
guiding the Flying Hour Program through PPBS is the Special Assistant for the Flying
Hour Program (N-88F), serving under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments, N-8. N88F is where the attempt is
made to meet the operational needs ofNavy and Marine Corps Aviation with a viable and
executable funding program. In other words, the Special Assistant to the Flying Hour
Program has the task of presenting the operating force requirements for the Flying Hour
Program to NAVCOMPT (Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Office of Budget) during the
Department of the Navy budget review and trying to produce an adequate, realistic, and
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sustainable budget that can withstand the scrutiny not only of Department of the Navy
analysts, but also that of the Department of Defense and Congress. [Ref. 14]
With so many layers of bureaucracy involved in resource planning, so many input
variables, and so few resources, it is easy to understand how budget requests for adequate
funding are never just a simple matter of adherence to formulas and financial models. In
relating this broad process to this thesis and Marine Forces Atlantic, two main points are
important. First, even the most critical issues at Marine Forces Atlantic may not be
pressing at the Department of the Navy level. Second, managers of flying hour funds
need to be able to accurately predict and justify their budgets well in order to withstand
the competition of the PPBS process. Failure to accurately predict costs or defend against
budget marks that may take away funding can lead to difficulties well into the future for
aviation commands. Therefore, to accurately predict costs, flying hour program
managers must understand their program cost behavior. Once they receive funding, they
must adequately manage the allocations given to them in the coming year, lest they lose
credibility, which can lead to a future loss of resources.
D. THE USE OF FINANCIAL MODELS AND THE FLYING HOUR
PROGRAM
Since understanding Flying Hour Program cost behavior is essential to effective
management of Flying Hour Program funding, this section reviews the basic Flying Hour
Program financial models that N-88F uses to produce its annual budget. At the risk of
oversimplification, this section attempts to provide a basic understanding of the signifi-
cant cost categories and predictive models used in the OP-20. As mentioned in the
beginning of the chapter, the term "OP-20" is simply a code for one of many Department
of the Navy budget exhibits for Navy Operations and Maintenance (0&M,N) appropria-
tions ranging from the OP-5 (budget detail by activity and subactivity) and OP-32
(summary of price and program changes), the most significant 0&M,N budget exhibits,
to OP-71, a budget exhibit for Organization Clothing and Equipment. [Ref. 15]
The OP-20 can be broken down into several predictive models. However, this
research focuses on the most significant models through which MARFORLANT receives
the majority of its FHP funding. The explanation of these predictive models is separated
into six sections: 1) Major OP-20 Flight Hour Categories, 2) Breakdown of OP-20 back
up exhibits, 3) the TACAIR OP-20 model, 4) the Fleet Air Training Model, 5) Other OP-
20 Sections, and 6) OP-20 Breakdown of Cost Per Hour.
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1. Major OP-20 Flight Hour Categories
Whether a version of an OP-20 model is being generated for future planning as
part of the POM, part of the President's Budget headed to Capitol Hill for debate, or is
part of the N-88 execution plan for the beginning of a new fiscal year, the FHP addresses




TACAIR/ASW Deployable combat squadrons for national defense.
2. Fleet Air Training Post graduate fleet replacement training squadrons.
3. Fleet Air Support Deployable and non-deployable support units.
4. Undergraduate Training Pilot and Naval Flight Officer basic training.
5. Reserve Navy and Marine Corps aviation reserve units.
[Ref. 16]
These categories reveal the complexity of the Flying Hour Program in the process
of delineating the different types of flying that occurs within the Department of the Navy.
For example, different models and series of the CH-53 may see service in four of the five
categories listed: flying tactical helicopter support in a combat squadron as part of
TACAIR, as a training aircraft for pilots receiving their initial training prior to joining a
deploying squadron, as part of HMX-1 performing duties in support of the President of
the United States, or in Reserve units across the United States performing training
missions similar to TACAIR squadrons. The same type of aircraft may fly in all the four
categories. However, the missions that it supports, and thus the cost of supporting the
aircraft in the different categories, may differ.
2. OP-20 Back-Up Exhibits
Although the OP-20 at its macro level becomes an aggregate of cost projections
by Program Element and Type/Model/Series of aircraft, it is more useful when broken
down by Major Claimant into the five major flight hour categories by Type/Model/Series





Schedule A TACAIR/ASW flight hour requirements.
2. Schedule B Training flight hour requirements.
3. The TACAIR OP-20 Model
An example of the OP-20 TACAIR model used to project flight hours and
budgeted cost is listed below:
T/M/S PAA CSR AMF REQUIRED MONTHS REQUIRED
H/M/C HOURS
AV-8B 80 x 1.4 x .98 x 25 x 12 = 32,928
REQUIRED PMR BUDGETED CPH BUDGET
HOURS HOURS
32,928 x .7802 =25,692 x $2,844.71 = S73.086M
This example shows how estimated annual flight hours are determined for the
AV-8B Harrier. Once the required flight hours have been determined, they are multiplied
by the pre-determined Primary Mission Readiness constant (traditionally 85%) agreed to
by the Navy, DOD and Congress. They are then deployed by the estimated cost per hour
for the coming budget year. The resulting dollar figure is the estimated dollars that this
type of aircraft is expected to use for the particular activity it is flying. The formula is the
same whether at the macro level, such as the Department of the Navy, or below the type
commander level such as at the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing.
The following list explains the individual components of the model in greater
detail:
Type/Model/Series (T/M/S):
Represents the type of aircraft and its current model. For example, there are
significant differences in the design of the F/A-18C vs. the F/A-18D.
Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA):
Represents the number of primary aircraft authorized by Resource Sponsors and
Aviation Master Plans for a particular level of budgeting. It is not to be confused with
the number of aircraft assigned to a unit.
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Crew-Seat-Ratio (CSR):
Is the ratio applied to the number of aircraft which represents the number of pilots
per aircraft determined necessary to man a given T/M/S in a squadron.
Aircrew Manning Factor (AMF):
Is the reduction factor in the OP-20 model. This variable adjusts for differences
between budgeted crews and actual aircrew, and represents the current percentage of a
given unit's table of organization that is actually manned.
Required Hours per Modelper Crew:
Is the pre-determined number of flight hours per month determined by a service's
Training and Readiness Manual (T&R Manual) that one aircrew needs per month to meet
their units and professional flying hour requirements. Navy and Marine TACAIR units
differ in their approach to generating this figure. Navy TACAIR H/M/C is driven by a
number of factors including the primary mission area of an aircraft to the priorities of a
Type Commander. Marine TACAIR H/M/C is more strictly related to the requirements
of each model's T&R manual.
Required Hours:
The number of hours that would allow a squadron to achieve 100% mission
readiness with a designated number of pilots. The formula is CSR x AMF.
Primary Mission Readiness (PMR):
PMR = Budgeted Flight Hours/Required Flight Hours. This yields a percentage
which shows the number of flight hours that Congress is willing to fund. Congress has
been told by the Department of the Navy that the minimum PMR necessary in order to
attain combat readiness is 85%. However, this number is often capped at 83% due to an
expectation that 2% of a pilot's hours will be simulator training. PMR is not often a true
readiness indicator because variations in training plans by commander, operational
schedule and type of aircraft may differ. The overall expectation is that a units readiness
can generally translate to its executed PMR.
Cost Per Hour (CPH):
CPH is the budgeted rate that is projected for costs for the particular Type/
Model/Series of aircraft. [Ref. 1 7]
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4. The Fleet Air Training Model
The formula below is one typically deployed in Schedule "B" for flight hour
requirements for Fleet Air Training of different types.
T/M/S NUMBER OF CAT NO SYL PILOT
A/C PILOTS HRS HOURS
AV-8B 14.0 I 17@ 150 2550
III 15® 45 675
IV 1(a), 15 105
TOTALS 39 3330
Fleet Air Training is somewhat less complicated to budget for since the training
requirements tend to have a standard requirement related to a training syllabus. A
training syllabus is a plan of required training flights that develop the flight skills of
pilots in accordance with an established standard. Since the syllabus is standardized and
the types of flights are known, it is relatively easy to predict the total flight hours to
complete a pilot training cycle. Once total hours have been required they can once again
be multiplied by the cost per hour for a particular aircraft in order to find the budgeted
dollar amount for the flight hours. The example continues below.
REQUIRED BUDGETED COST PER HOUR REQUIRED BUDGETED
HOURS HOURS COST COST
3330 3330 3571.26 1 1.892 M 1 1.892 M
Abbreviations for the Fleet Air Training Formula are listed below.
CAT (Pilot Training Category):
Specifies the type of training pilots are receiving based on the following five
categories:
• CAT I. First Tour Aviator or First Tour in Aircraft Type. Receives 100%
of syllabus.
• CAT II. Usually second tour in Type Aircraft. Receives approximately
75% of CAT I syllabus.
• CAT III. Third Tour or Transition from one aircraft type to another.
Receives approximately 50% of CAT I syllabus.
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• CAT IV. A quick NATOPS (Naval Air Training and Operating
Procedures Standardization) check in order to verify the pilot has enough
training to safely operate the aircraft without supervision.
• CAT V. A specialized syllabus for foreign officers or transition from
fixed wing to helo requiring 25% to 75% of original syllabus. [Ref 1 8]
5. Other OP-20 Sections
The OP-20 carries budget projections for Fleet Air Support, Undergraduate
Training and Reserve Forces as well. However, except for discussing MARFORLANT's
allocations of FHP funds for Fleet Air Support, the scope of this thesis will not detail
budgeting for these categories. [Ref. 19]
6. OP-20 Breakdown of Cost Per Hour and Total Budgeted Cost
Of all the sections of the OP-20 explained thus far, the determination of Cost Per
Hour and Total Budgeted Costs is the most important exhibit for the Flying Hour
Program. The previous examples showed that the budgeted flight hours were multiplied
by the cost per hour for a particular aircraft type depending on cost category (TACAIR,
Fleet Air Training, etc) for a particular Type/Model/Series.
The examples for TACAIR and Fleet Air Training displayed the budgeted flight
hours multiplied by a Cost Per Hour determined by the Special Assistant for the Flying
Hour Program. Although Cost Per Hour is the final, combined standard cost to be
multiplied by flight hours, its composition is very complex and will be the subject of
further analysis in the thesis. Basically, Cost Per Hour is the total cost to operate a
particular type model and series of aircraft. An example formula from the OP-20
describes the model's compilation of different cost categories into a single cost per hour
by Type/Model/Series.
TMS FORCES UTIL HOURS
AV-8B 60.0 19.339 13924
COSTPER HOUR
FUEL DLR MNT TOT
629.14 2224.61 888.30 3742.05
ANNUAL COSTIN MILLIONS
FUEL DLR MNT TOTAL HOURLYFUEL
CONS. RATE
8.760 30.975 12.369 52.104 16.103
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Forces:
The number of primary aircraft by T/M/S authorized for use in the formula.
Utilization Rate (UTIL):
Utilization Rate is the pre-determined hours per month that one aircraft is
budgeted to fly. This can be determined by the formula: Utilization Rate= Budgeted
Flight Hours/(Forces for T/M/S)(12 months).
Hours:
Hours stands for Budgeted Hours as shown earlier in the TACAIR and Fleet Air
Training Models.
Fuel Cost Per Hour:
Annual cost of fuel is determined by (fuel consumption rate for the particular
T/M/S) x (cost per composite barrel of fuel) x (budgeted annual flight hours). Cost per
composite barrel of fuel usually is determined by Type Commanders and most often
relates to a mix of JP4 and JP5, although JP8 and commercially available fuel can also be
purchased. Fuel consumption rates are expressed in barrels/hour, e.g., 42 gal/barrel. Fuel
Cost Per Hour = Total Budgeted Fuel Cost/Budgeted Hours. [Ref. 20]
Depot Level Repairables(DLR)Cost Per Hour:
More correctly known as aviation depot level repairables(AVDLR), DLR is the
most expensive of the three Flying Hour Program cost categories. (POL, MNT, DLR) It
refers to costs incurred by repairing major components of aircraft or weapons systems
that must go to a depot or contractor because repairing the aircraft is either beyond the
capability of an aviation unit's organic or support maintenance, or is simply uneconom-
ical to repair at those levels. [Ref. 21] DLR(Cost per Hour) = Total Budgeted DLR
Costs/Budgeted Flight Hours.
Maintenance(MNT) Cost Per Hour:
MNT is an abbreviation that stands for Aviation Fleet Maintenance or AFM.
Ideally, this cost category captures maintenance performed at Organizational and
Intermediate Maintenance levels. Organizational Maintenance (OMA) costs include
consumables such as paints, rags, cleaning agents and consumable parts for the periodic
maintenance of the aircraft. Intermediate Maintenance (IMA) costs relate more to
complete repair of major aircraft components. For both categories tools, flight
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equipment, and safety items are included. MNT(Cost per Hour) = Total Budgeted MNT
Costs/ Budgeted Flight Hours. [Ref. 22]
The rest of the formula is Total Cost Per Hour equaling the addition of all three
sub-cost categories. Also, costs can be analyzed by their total cost on the OP-20 in
millions of dollars.
These are basics of the OP-20 budgeting model. More complex are the
deliberations and data collection efforts that go into determining what budgeted costs and
flight hours will be for a coming fiscal year. The resource politics of PPBS play a part in
the outcome of the rates, but there is also considerable annual controversy about the best
way to predict costs captured from previous years within the system. In review, flight
hours are used as the basic metric to measure all costs from fuel to depot level
repairables, even though the determination of budgeted flight hours differs for categories
such as TACAIR versus Fleet Air Training.
E. PREDICTION OF COSTS IN THE OP-20 MODEL
Historical costs in each major Flying Hour Program cost category are tracked in
the Flying Hour Program Projection System (FHPS) that is physically located at the
Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP-M) in Mechanicsburg, Pennslyvania. [Ref. 23]
Over time, N-88 has worked to refine its formulas predicting costs in future years. The
former N-889 method for determining budgeted Cost Per Hour was to use a three-year
moving average from the Naval Air Type Commands to smooth aberrant cost fluctuations
in the historical data. A quote from a former Special Assistant to the Flying Hour
Program explains:
For example, to obtain the 1993 CPH figures released on the POM OP-20
in June, 1992, N889E took the 1989, 1990, and 1991 actual fiscal year
expenditure totals by cost pool and the total flight hours flown from both
the Navy's cost accounting system and the FHCRS (Flying Hour Cost
Report System), manipulated these figures to achieve a three-year average
in 1992 dollars, then applied the applicable 7111 (NAVCOMPT Notice
7111) escalators for inflation/deflation. [Ref. 24]
However, escalation of aviation costs has been so prevalent in the last several years that
N889E has switched to taking the previous year's cost data with predicted inflation/
deflation indices applied because of the unpredictability of FHP costs.
In summary, as basic as the OP-20 model may be, the model is only simple from a
descriptive viewpoint. Both historical and current research reveals the incredibly
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complex operational and logistical system that is used to build and execute the entire
budget mechanism based on the Cost per Flight Hour model. Again, the often repeated
question about this formula is: Does the OP-20 budgeting model accurately predict what
the annual costs of the Flying Hour Program will be? The answer to this question is that
it does not predict annual costs accurately. The next section reviews relevant Flying
Hour Program research and other analysis of the Flying Hour Program to use as deductive
benchmarks for analysis later in the thesis.
F. KEY CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS FHP RESEARCH
This section is broken into two parts. The first reviews literature relevant to this
thesis where quantitative analysis has attempted to develop a better predictive model for
the Flying Hour Program than the OP-20 models. The second section reviews literature
that provides qualitative benchmarks for the Flying Hour Program including Simons'
framework for his book Levers of Control .
1. Previous Quantitative Analysis of the Flying Hour Program
Three previous research efforts were reviewed to develop the quantitative
framework for this research. The first was research conducted by Byrne at the Naval
Postgraduate School in 1987. Her thesis, Analysis of the Aircraft Flying Hour Program
at the Pacific Missile Test Center , attempted to build a model derived from monthly cost
data to predict aircraft cost rates for the Pacific Missile Test Center. Using flight hours as
an independent variable, a regression was conducted against fuel costs. The analysis was
conducted separately for cost data on 9 different types of aircraft. Although the thesis
claimed there was a strong correlation between fuel consumed per hour by the aircraft
and actual flight hours, only the F-14 aircraft showed a correlation that explained more
than 75 percent of the relationship. A similar regression of flight hours versus parts cost
by Byrne showed no correlation between the cost and consumption of parts and the
number of flight hours flown. Bryne concluded that maintenance costs needed to be
charged as a fixed rate for Pacific Missile Test Center customers. All data were adjusted
for inflation and smoothed using a moving average to compensate for the inexact timing
of when costs were recorded. To summarize the key points of this thesis were:
1
.
Fuel costs showed some correlation to flight hours, but 25 to 75 percent of
the relationship between the two variables was unexplained. (See Figure
2.2)
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Maintenance costs for parts showed no correlation to flight hours, and was
assumed to be a fixed cost of operations. [Ref. 25]
Type A3 A6 A7 F4 F14 F18 H46 C12 P3
R2 34% 27% 49% 47% 76% 20% 28% 45% 56%
Figure 2.2. R2 by Aircraft Type at Pacific Missile Test Center [Ref. 22]
In 1994, another Naval Postgraduate School student wrote Modeling F/A-18
Flight Hour Program Costs Using Regression Analysis . In this research, Arkley
conducted a regression analysis of F/A- 1 8 cost data from the Navy and Marine Corps
Reserve. His goal was to develop a mathematical model that would allow financial
managers to predict total end of fiscal year costs with only 2 or 3 months of actual
execution data. Like Byrne, Arkley regressed flight hours as the independent variable
against four separate components of cost data for the F/A-18: Fuel Costs, Organizational
Maintenance Costs (OMA), Intermediate Maintenance Costs (IMA), and Aviation Depot
Level Maintenance Costs (AVDLR). Studying reserve unit aviation cost behavior in this
way was unique because active duty unit costs are not tracked at the same level of detail
as reserve costs. As described earlier in this chapter, active duty cost records combine
OMA and IMA costs into one category: MNT.
Like Bryne, Arkley adjusted his cost data for inflation rates and the variable cost
of fuel. However, for IMA and AVDLR costs Arkley also adjusted his data for changes
in annual Defense Business Operation Fund rates (DBOF...now Navy Working Capital
Funds) and for increased costs due to decreased jet engine life cycle times. Arkley 's
regression results showed very strong correlation between flight hour and fuel costs, and
between flight hours and OMA costs. Even IMA and AVDLR costs showed a much
stronger correlation than Bryne's research. A summary of Arkley's results are shown
below:
Cost Pool Minimum Group R2 Maximum Group R2
Fuel Cost vs. Flight Hours 93.8% 100%
OMA Cost vs. Flight Hours 48.8% 97.8%
IMA Cost vs. Flight Hours 59.3%o 94.1%
DLR Cost vs. Flight Hours 67.9% 96.0%
Figure 2.3. Averaged Regression Results for Reserve F/A-18s [Ref. 27]
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Figure 2.3 demonstrates that Arkley was able to more successfully adjust the data
to identify relationships between cost pools. Fuel and OMA Costs, as expected, were
quite high. However, even regression of Depot Level Repariables was much stronger
than expected considering Byrne's results. In Arkley' s conclusion, he attributed some of
this success to the fact that the Reserves are able to more accurately capture the data
because of their cost pools, and also because of their operating procedures. For example,
Reserve aircraft fuel is immediately paid for before fueling an aircraft flight. Therefore,
the costs are tracked more accurately. In addition, the Reserve units were much more
likely to use one fuel rate, and had less chance that free fuel was mixed into the fuel
counted as paid.
In summary; the following assumptions from Arkley may be applied as
benchmarks for this thesis:
1
.
Fuel and OMA costs fit significantly when analyzing the variable
relationship between flight hours and these cost pools.
2. IMA costs often show less statistical significance when regressed versus
flight hours because of maintenance time lags and work that can be
repaired by other commands at other locations.
3. DLR cost can show strong statistical significance, if data is adjusted
properly.
Other previous quantitative research relevant to this thesis was a 1997-98 study by
the Naval Center for Cost Analysis, to "investigate near and long term solutions for FHP
'pricing methodology' and 'requirements validation'." "The goal of the study requested
by the CNO was to try to develop a better model to ensure that the FHP was "properly
resourced,... executable, balanced, and fully defensible with OSD and the Congress."
[Ref. 28] This study was successful in building a model that developed a regression
formula for total program costs, using total FHP cost as the dependent variable and total
flight hours as the independent variable. NCCA also was able to find statistically
significant relationships for total cost data from AIRPAC and AIRLANT. They were
unable to develop statistically significant relationships for any other sub-claimant or
claimant levels, nor were they able to define and vailidate models using other data sets
that reflected aircraft age, number of T/M/S aircraft, number of sorties flown, or by
specific service. Reserve units were not included in this data base. In summary, the
NCCA conclusions relevant to this thesis are:
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1.
Regression analysis can yield a statistically significant relationship which
reflects total cost vs. flight hours at the Department of the Navy level.
2. Comparisons ofNCCA model versus OP-20 POM predictions for budget
outyears showed that the Department of the Navy was underestimating the
future cost of the program. [Ref. 29]
3. Fuel costs showed a variable relationship with flight hours, consumables
showed a fixed plus variable relationship, while AVDLR costs did not
show any significant relationship to number of hours and was modeled as
a fixed cost. [Ref. 30]
2. Previous Qualitative Analysis of the Flying Hour Program
A number of Naval Postgraduate School theses have been written addressing
qualitative aspects of the Flying Hour Program. Most theses that did not have a
quantitative analytical methodology addressed the workings of the Flying Hour Program
only at the Department of the Navy, CNO or Type Commander Level (e.g., AIRLANT,
AIRPAC). One of the most useful in preparation for this thesis was Flight Hour Costing
at the Type Commander and Navy Staff Levels: An Analytical Assessment by Edwards
(1992). This thesis explained budgeting and execution in precise detail. Although some
of the information has become outdated, it is still a fundamentally strong attempt to map
the process.
Key conclusions from the Edwards thesis include:
1
.
An assessment that assets were being over-used without resource
management necessary to replace aging aircraft and equipment. [Ref. 3 1 ]
2. Questions about the suitability of Cost Per Hour as a reflection of Flying
Hour Program Costs, especially because of the volatility of maintenance
procedures and the difficulty of accurate cost collection.
An additional source that provides insight into recurring complaints from
Congress about the Flying Hour Program is a General Accounting Office (GAO) report
of July 1989: The Flying Hour Program's Budget and Execution . [Ref. 32] Despite the
fact that this report is nearly ten years old, many NPS theses written afterwards reported
and expanded upon the findings of this report. GAO was asked by Congress in this report
to evaluate the validity of the FHP process in determining Flying Hour Program require-
ments and trends, and to examine whether execution reflected budget requests. Although
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many critics in the Navy and Marine Corps take issue with the findings in this report
because of its simplistic and overly critical approach, the report nevertheless exposes
weaknesses in the FHP from an independent perspective. The key finding in this report
relevant to this thesis is that the GAO believed the program: "lacked objective budget
estimates and performance goals" [Ref. 33]. In essence, the report complained that funds
requested were not easily linked to a pre-determined level of readiness. For example, the
Navy stated that aircrews for F-14 Tomcats required 25 hours of flight training per
month, yet there was no study to prove that these established requirements were actually
valid.
These reviews of previous analysis are important to the thesis because they
provide points of reference for the next chapter that surveys the Flying Hour Program at
MARFORLANT, and for the results from this research analysis. However, before
moving to Chapter III, a framework for analyzing the organization of the Flying Hour
Program and the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan must be defined.
3. A Framework for Analysis ofFHP as a Management Control System
Simons' findings about the way managers implement strategic decisions through
management control systems is explained in his book Levers of Control . [Ref. 28]
According to Simons, a management control system is the, "formal information based
routines and procedures managers use to maintain or alter patterns in organizational
activities." [Ref. 34] In attempting to prescribe how the MARFORLANT Aviation
Budget Officer should best manage the FHP at his level, this framework appears to be
useful. The Flying Hour Program reflects Simons description of a management control
system in that it provides managers at all levels information about the requirements and
execution of aviation budgets, and supports operations necessary to accomplish the
mission ofNavy and Marine Corps aviation.
Simons' criticism on the strategies that organizations should execute is that not
much has been discussed about how strategies are implemented and monitored for
success. For example, a Flying Hour Program budget from an OP-20 is an annual
strategy. However, it must be executed successfully. In this type of situation Simons
presents "how to manage tensions between freedom and constraint, empowerment and
accountability, and top down direction versus bottom up creativity." [Ref. 35] These
tensions are classified into four separate management control categories: belief systems,
boundary systems, diagnostic control systems, and interactive control systems.
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A beliefs system is, "the explicit set of organizational definitions that senior
managers communicate formally and reinforce systematically to provide basic values,
purpose, and direction for the organization." [Ref. 36] This type of system is often
communicated through documents and other forms of communication which impart this
vision to members of the organization. "The primary purpose of a beliefs system is to
inspire and guide organizational search and discovery. When problems arise in
implementing strategy, a beliefs system helps participants to determine the types of
problems to tackle and the solutions to search for." [Ref. 37] Military examples of
beliefs systems relevant to this thesis include the Marine Corps core values of "honor,
courage, and commitment," or the vision the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan has for
maintaining current readiness without jeopardizing future readiness.
Boundary systems "impose important limits on the organizational search activity
motivated by beliefs systems." [Ref. 38] In other words, they establish limits to the
search for solutions to problems. "Although boundary systems are essentially proscrip-
tive or negative systems, they allow managers to delegate decision making and thereby
allow the organization to achieve maximum flexibility and creativity." [Ref. 39] The
laws described in the Uniform Code of Military Justice are examples of very formalized
boundary systems. However, there are also boundary systems with less formalized limits,
such as the mark and reclama process to budget submissions in PPBS.
Diagnostic control systems provide feedback to managers about whether a
specific goal is being achieved. "These feedback systems, which are the backbone of
traditional management control, are designed to ensure predictable goal achievement."
[Ref. 40] "Three features distinguish diagnostic control systems: (1) the ability to
measure the outputs of a process, (2) the existence of predetermined standards against
which actual results can be compared, and (3) the ability to correct deviations from
standards." [Ref. 41] Simons commented that diagnostic control systems could often
have a "powerful" impact on organizations because of unintended consequences and
incentives that often constrain innovation. Many components of the Flying Hour
Program, such as readiness reports and costing systems, can be described as diagnostic
control systems.
Interactive control systems are the opposite of diagnostic control systems
because they help managers to deal with strategic uncertainty. "These systems stimulate
search and learning, allowing new strategies to emerge as participants throughout the
organization respond to perceived opportunities and threats." [Ref. 42] According to
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Simons, interactive control systems have four "defining characteristics: 1) information
generated by the system is an important and recurring agenda addressed by the highest
levels of management, 2) the interactive control system demands frequent and regular
attention from operating managers at all levels of the organization, 3) data generated by
the system are interpreted and discussed in face-to-face meetings of superiors,
subordinates, and peers, and 4) the system is a catalyst for the continual challenge and
debate of underlying data, assumptions, and action plans." [Ref. 43] The Flying Hour
Program and specific components of the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan are examples of
interactive control systems.
Much of Simons' work discusses the interaction of these four separate types of
control systems. Oftentimes, one system works in opposition to the other. An important
lesson of Simons' book is understanding how to balance and align these control systems
to successfully achieve the goals of an organization. Figure 2.4 depicts Simons' manage-







Interactive Control Systems Diagnostic Control Sys
Figure 2.4. Controlling Business Strategy: Key Variables To Be Analyzed
The NCCA Cost Analysis, Byrne's thesis and Arkley's thesis combined the
organizational ideas of Edwards and Simons, provide rich background and robust ideas to
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use in analysis of the FHP at MARFORLANT. A further discussion of the research
methodology is provided in Chapter IV.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter strives to give the reader the basic tools necessary to understand the
remainder of the thesis. Federal budgeting was analyzed to provide an overall perspec-
tive on the dynamics and limitations of the federal budget process relative to the Flying
Hour Program. The Planning Programming and Budgeting System sets similar
constraints for the Flying Hour Program, in particular because of the length and complex-
ity of the PPBS and budget processes. The basic OP-20 model was explained to provide
background for regression analysis. The literature review was conducted in order to
develop hypotheses or assumptions about the Flying Hour Program defined from
previous research.
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III. MARINE AVIATION, MACP AND MARFORLANT
This chapter focuses specifically on the background issues and problems with the
Flying Hour Program and Marine Corps Aviation. It explains the operational and
administrative organization of MARFORLANT relevant to the administration of the
Flying Hour Program, the duties of the MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer,
problems facing the FHP at MARFORLANT, and an overview of the Marine Aviation
Campaign Plan.
A. ORGANIZATION OF MARINE AVIATION AT MARFORLANT
U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic is one of one of two major Marine Corps operational
commands that provide operating forces to joint unified commands, subordinate unified
commands, or joint task force commanders. In joint warfighting organization for
operations, a unified command is defined as "a command with a broad continuing
mission under a single commander," composed of significant assigned components of
two or more military departments. The unified command is established and designated
by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Ref. 44] As Figure 3.1 illustrates, five unified
commands are organized by geographical area, the other four are organized by function.
These commands are the centers of operational decision making for the nation's global
military capabilities.
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Figure 3.1. U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic within the Structure of the Unified
Commands
A joint task force (JTF) is a temporary warfighting organization with a specific
mission established by a unified, sub-unified or specified command. Marine forces may
be assigned to a JTF or may even provide the primary structure for the JTF command
element or operating forces.
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MARFORLANT is the Marine Corps' component command organized under the
unified combatant command, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). A service
component command is defined as, "a command consisting of the service component
commander and all those service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments,
organizations and installations under the command including the support forces, that have
been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified
command or joint task force." [Ref. 45] Therefore, in a joint environment the
Commander of U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic has the following responsibilities:
• To make recommendations about proper employment of Marine forces to
• the Joint Force Commander.
• To accomplish any operational missions assigned by the Joint Force
Commander.
• To select and nominate specific units of the Marine Corps for assignment
to subordinate force commands.
• To retain overall responsibility for service specific functions such as
internal administration, training, logistics, and service intelligence opera-
tions.
In addition to his responsibilities to do this for USACOM, the Commander of
U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic is also the component commander for U.S. European
Command, and U.S. Southern Command.
To make matters more complex, because of the unique organization of the Marine
Corps, which can primarily fight as part of the Navy-Marine Corps team as part of
deploying units in the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, the Commander of U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic
is also the Commanding General of Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic and Europe, and U.S.
Marine Corps Bases Atlantic. To summarize, MARFORLANT is a command that
oversees the training, administration, maintenance and preparation for employment of all
Marine Operating Forces on the east coast of the United States, and in the Atlantic,
European, and Southern joint geographical areas. [Ref. 46] Figure 3.2 illustrates the
command relationships of COMMARFORLANT.
Internally, MARFORLANT has two major subordinate organizations. The first is
2nd Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF), which is the warfighting arm of
MARFORLANT. II MEF is composed of 2nd Marine Division, 2nd Force Service Support
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Figure 3.2. Different Command Responsibilities Held by Commander,
U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic
Group, and 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing." The second is the array of Marine bases which
support the operating forces. These primarily include Camp Lejeune, which is the home
of the II MEF Command Element, 2nd Marine Division, and 2nd Force Service Support
Group and Commander, Combined Air Bases East (COMCABEAST) which includes
New River, Cherry Point, and Beaufort Marine Corps Air Stations. This is the relevant,
not all inclusive organization of MARFORLANT. Figure 3.3 shows the major
subordinate organizations ofMARFORLANT.
From an aviation perspective, the Commander U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic has
the majority of his assets organized under the Commanding General, 2nd Marine Aircraft
Wing. These are closely tied with the base support structure of COMCABEAST, which
receive a small percentage of aviation funding for support operations and Fleet Air
Support operations. In addition, MARFORLANT funds HMX-1 in Quantico, Virginia,
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Figure 3.3. Major Subordinate Organizations ofMARFORLANT [Ref. 49]
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The 2 Marine Aircraft Wing's tactical aviation and training squadrons are organized
within four Marine Aircraft Groups (MAGs). These four groups, their home station and







Cherry Pt. AV-8B, EA-6B, TAV-8B
New River UH-1N, AH-1 W, CH-46E, CH-53E
New River UH-1N, AH-1 W, CH-46E, CH-54E
Beaufort F/A- 1 8A, F/A- 1 8C, F/A- 1 8D
COMCABEAST receives some funding from the Flying Hour Program to support
base operations and maintenance contracts for a small arm of support aircraft. These
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include the C-9B transport, and UC-12B transport aircraft, and the HH-46 and UH-1 for
organic lift and search and rescue capabilities. [Ref. 47]
HMX-1 conducts helicopter support by flying the following types of aircraft: CH-
46E, CH-53E, VH-3D, and VH-60N. "The VH-3 and VH-60 are used exclusively to
transport the President of the United States. The CH-46 and CH-53 models have a dual
mission of executive support (staff and press only) and follow-on test and evaluation,"
usually in conjunction with activities at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. [Ref. 48]
The continuing operations and maintenance of all these aircraft is funded by the
Navy Operations and Maintenance ("Blue" dollars) appropriation. These are distributed
administratively to MARFORLANT from the Commander, Naval Air Forces Atlantic
Fleet (COMNAVAIRLANT), which is a Type Command organized under the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. AIRLANT is a subclaimant in the resource
allocation process and is at the end of a long chain of administrative and operational
commands. MARFORLANT is the central distributor of aviation funds to the Marine
Aviation Combat Element at MARFORLANT. Although MARFORLANT is not an
actual cost center for the spending of FHP funds, they allocate and monitor the use of
FHP resources in subordinate units. (Figure 3.4)
Navy O&M funding allocated from COMNAVAIRLANT to MARFORLANT
can be broken down into two broad funding categories: Flying Hour Program funds, and
non-Flying Hour Program funds. Flying Hour Program funds allocated from AIRLANT
fall into two Operational Target Functional Categories (OFCs): OFC-01 and OFC-50.
Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO) is OFC-01 and breaks costs into two direct cost pools.
Code 7B is the cost pool that captures fuel costs. Code 7F is the cost pool for aircrew
flight equipment. Aircraft Operatons Maintenance is OFC-50 and contains two important
maintenance cost pools: Code 7L is referred to as Aviation Fleet Maintenance because it
typically contains funds for aircraft maintenance to be spent by fleet maintenance units.
Code 9S is referred to as Depot Level Repairables and stands for maintenance that
ordinarily is conducted by Aviation Repair Depots, outside contractors, or the aircraft
manufacturer. The realities of these cost pools will be analyzed in Chapter IV and V. In
practice these cost pools do not exclusively contain the costs that their titles would
suggest.
Non-Flying Hour Program OPTARs allocate funds to MARFORLANT in four
categories. Funding to maintain airfield equipment, such as aircraft tow vehicles, is



















































Figure 3.4 DOD FHP Financial Organization and Flow of Blue Dollars [Ref. 51]
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Code 8X. Funding for Aircraft Operations Support (AC OPS) such as range fees,
expenses for pre-positioning of aircraft in Norway, and different maintenance contracts
related to operations support also comes from OFC-50 under Code 2F. Funding for
administrative travel related to Marine Aviation is allocated from OFC-21 (TAD).
Finally, funding for the movement of aircraft and personnel in the conduct of operations
and training is collected under OFC 23 and is called SDT or Transportation of Things
(TOT). Figure 3.5 shows the breakdown of OFCs at the MARFORLANT level and
below. [Ref. 50]















Figure 3.5. Breakdown of Operational Target Functional Categories at
MARFORLANT [Ref. 52]
In summary, this section illustrates the operational and fiscal organization of
MARFORLANT both externally and internally, and also illustrates the administrative
flow of funding into different Operational Target Functional Categories. The process and
organization has not been described in its entirety. However, this description provides a
detailed enough description to comprehend the issues within the context of this thesis.
B. THE MARFORLANT AVIATION BUDGET OFFICER
Within MARFORLANT, the Aviation Budget Officer is the primary manager of
funds allocated from AIRLANT. In performing his duties he has the following
responsibilities:
• Makes recommendations to the Comptroller, MARFORLANT about the
distribution ofNavy O&M funding to subordinate aviation units.
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•Monitors the spending ofNavy O&M funding by subordinate units.
Monitors the development of future OP-20s in the Defense Department
Programming and Budgeting process.
• Maintains liaison with AIRLANT, N-88, and Aviation Plans and Policies
(APP) at Headquarters Marine Corps regarding the interests of
MARFORLANT in the programming, budgeting and execution process.
Each year, the MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer must coordinate with
AIRLANT in both the POM budgeting and budget execution process. Once the President
signs a budget and dollars are allocated to MARFORLANT into different OPTARs, the
Aviation Budget Officer must also coordinate with AIRLANT and subordinate
commands to determine how funds will be apportioned by fiscal year quarter, and how
they will be divided by organization. In addition to dividing funds by cost pool and
major organization, funds also must be set aside for transfer to Landing Force, U.S. 6th
Fleet (LF6F) for use by aviation forces during deployments to the Mediterranean area,
and to Marine Corps unit deployments to Japan or other operational locations. [Ref. 53]
The rest of the chapter analyzes the broad background, issues, and problems of
Marine Aviation and the Flying Hour Program that the MARFORLANT Aviation Budget
Officer must consider when conducting his analysis and budget recommendations.
C. MARINE AVIATION AND THE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM
In a 1995 speech, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak,
commented that the Marine Corps had three essential characteristics. He stated that the
Marine Corps was always naval in nature, always expeditionary as the nation's first
response force, and always able to fight with combined arms. In his view, aviation was
essential to fighting with combined arms. He said, "Without combined arms there is no
MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force)—without the MAGTF there will eventually be
no Marine Corps. The Marine Corps without Marine aviation is simply a non-starter!"
[Ref. 54]
Like so many facets of the Marine Corps, this is true not only because of the
unique organization and capability of the MAGTF, but also because of innovative ideas
about aviation that the Marine Corps has effectively applied in battle. In the past, Marine
aviators pioneered close air support techniques as a devastating and accurate method of
fire support. Equally important was the development of aerial envelopment doctrine
using helicopters during amphibious assaults. In the present, Marine Expeditionary Units
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(MEUs) as part of Amphibious Ready Groups have been continually deployed to trouble
spots throughout the world. The end of the Cold War and the increase in regional
instability has meant that MEUs rate of involvement in crisis operations during the 1 990s
has risen. The need for a responsive force for small crisis operations and for a more
traditional conventional force in readiness highlight the demand for well trained aviators
and well maintained equipment. In the future, Marine Aviation will remain relevant to
the Marine Corps. The fielding of the V-22 Osprey begins in MARFORLANT next year.
Recent warfighting experiments have shown how the range of the Osprey will allow
battlefield commanders to project amphibious combat power faster and farther than ever
before. Just as the introduction of the helicopter changed the techniques of amphibious
combat over 50 years ago, the Osprey will also spur innovative new tactics and
techniques for amphibious warfare.
In achieving these visions and accomplishing the Marine Corps core mission,
there is little distinction between peacetime and wartime readiness. The Marine Corps
and Marine Aviation must be ready all the time. To be ready, Marine Aviation needs
sufficient "blue dollar" funding through the Flying Hour Program. As Chapter II
illustrated, Marine aircraft are inextricably a part of Naval Aviation. From the allocation
of resources, to the training of new pilots, to the aviation supply system, the Marine
Corps is dependent upon Department of the Navy resources to perform its mission. A
comparison of the total dollars going to Navy versus Marine Corps units highlights the
fact that Marine concerns can be lost in the overall OP-20 budget model.
From an administrative perspective, consider the layers of administrative
commands illustrated in Figure 3.4 between MARFORLANT and the administrators of
the Flying Hour Program at NAVAIR. Between the time that authorization and
appropriation bills are signed by the President of the United States, to the time that
squadron OPTARs (Operating Targets) are determined, the funds allocated to Marine
squadrons and air stations may be reduced because higher financial echelons establish
reserves for budgeting contingencies levied by DOD comptrollers.
Likewise, from the perspective of the relative size and influence of aviation
budgets, MARFORLANT' s Flying Hour Program is small compared to AIRLANT's,
from which East Coast Marine Aviation receives its funding. Figure 3.6 illustrates how
aviation funding is divided between the Navy and Marine Corps at the AIRLANT level.
The graph shows that the Marine Corps received less than one third of AIRLANT's
resources. In 1998, Operations and Maintenance, Navy authorizations for
MARFORLANT aviation totaled 411 million dollars, a mere 29% of AIRLANT's 1.41
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billion dollar 1998 budget. [Ref. 55] On the other hand from the perspective of
MARFORLANT, Navy Operations and Maintenance funds accounted for nearly half of
the entire MARFORLANT budget. Figure 3.7 shows a comparison of Blue versus Green
(Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps) funds at MARFORLANT. [Ref. 56]
Figure 3.6. Comparison ofFY 98 Aviation Funding between
MARFORLANT ACE and COMNAVAIRLANT (in millions)
Figure 3.7. FY98 Blue vs. Green Dollars at MARFORLANT (in millions)
Flying Hour Funding at MARFORLANT allows Marine Aviation to maintain a
pre-eminent position in the U.S. military and in the world as a relevant and reliable air
combat element that can project power for Marines in short notice crisis situations.
D. FHP PROBLEMS WHICH THREATEN MARFORLANT FUNDING
In the 1 990s, the MARFORLANT aviation budget has been threatened by several
different problems. All seem to be inherent to the entire Flying Hour Program. However,
that does not mean they have any less impact on MARFORLANT Aviation. In fact, they
can be more of a problem for the Marine Corps because of the relative size of Marine
Aviation. A combination of complex variables that are difficult to predict such as parts
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failure rates, cash shortages in Navy Working Capital Funds, and backlash effects from
budget tightening measures have caused these problems to occur across the spectrum of
Naval Aviation.
Some of the problems listed below were addressed by the Naval Aviation
Maintenance and Supply Readiness (AMSR) group that met in April 1998. AMSR was a
joint team of Navy, Marine, and other DOD managers who met in San Diego, California
to discuss the problems driving up the cost and driving down the readiness of naval
aviation. The team identified 18 separate issues that required study and solutions to
increase material readiness and decrease cost. [Ref. 57]
1. Failure of OP-20 to Accurately Predict Costs
Since the OP-20 model formerly used a three year moving average to predict
costs, the smoothing of historical cost data was close to annual costs of the Flying Hour
Program. This "smoothing" of the data using a moving average also meant that predicted
costs lagged behind actual costs, especially as Naval Aircraft aged. When the old OP-20
budgets failed to accurately predict the correct Cost Per Hour for aircraft, the usual
practice was for commands to seek additional funding through the "Mid-Year Review"
process, where claimants request additional funding during March of each fiscal year.
Eventually, moving averages were eliminated altogether in favor of the most recent
historical cost data. However, as budgets became tighter during the 1990s, less money
was available at mid-year reviews, and the process of programming funds every two
years (conducting the POM during even budget years) meant that OP-20 cost per hour
based on the most recent historical data still lagged behind actual costs. [Ref. 58] The
resulting funding shortfalls have typically resulted in "bow waves." A "bow wave" is a
funding shortage caused by deferred maintenance shifted into the next fiscal year to keep
a unit operating. This practice has the effect of compounding over multiple years if the
OP-20 continues to fail to predict costs and additional funds are not appropriated to pay
off the "bow wave."
2. Peace Dividend Raiding ofO&M Dollars
Congressional and Department of Defense analysts, searching for efficiencies in
the defense budget have adopted the frequent practice of forcing efficiency savings on
claimants by factoring a "negative budget wedge" into future budgets. A "negative
budget wedge" is a projected savings through an improved process. Unfortunately, cost
savings using this approach do not always materialize, and may result in additional
funding shortfalls. In addition, an increase in unfunded contingency operations by U.S.
forces in the 1990s often meant that the Department of Defense had to levy 'taxes' on the
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military services to pay the operational bill. Worse, each service would simply have to
rearrange insufficient funds within its own budgets to cover the operational expenses.
3. Aging Aircraft and Diminished Procurement Funding
During the 1980s the Department of Defense had large enough budgets to field
multiple new types of aircraft. The limited wear on the aircraft plus manufacturers
warranties on the equipment meant that maintenance costs were lower. However, as
aircraft began to age in the 1990s, and older aircraft from the 1960s and 1970s continued
to be used, the cost of maintaining the aircraft increased. In addition, procurement
funding for new replacement aircraft was significantly reduced to fund current operations,
or to achieve budget savings. The result is increased Aviation Fleet and Depot Level
maintenance costs for parts reaching the end of their service life. An example of this is
reflected in Figure 3.8 from the 1997 NCCA study which showed an increase in parts that
were declared Beyond the Capability of Maintenance (BCM). This means that a broken
part is either unrepairable at an organizational or intermediate maintenance level, or is too
costly to repair. In either case, it must be bought with the risk that the cost of the part
has escalated as well.
Figure 3.8. Increase in Overall Parts which are BCM-1 (Beyond
Capability of Maintenance—Repair Not Authorized) [Ref. 59]
4. Failure of Equipment to Meet Life-Cycle Goals
In the annual formulation of AFM and Depot Level maintenance costs by N-889,
program managers from the Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP, Mechanicsburg,
Pennslyvania) produce engineering cost estimates to predict a given number of each
major type of part that will fail during the coming year. Often times the NAVICP
engineers failed to accurately predict the Mean Time Between Failure of a particular part,
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or the number of broken parts in a particular year. As a result, the cost of many parts
continued to rise, driving up AFM and Depot level costs. Arkley discussed how the
General Electric F-404 engine for the F- 1 8 failed to reach its original estimated life cycle
and thus significantly raised intermediate maintenance costs. [Ref. 60] Another example
of an unforeseen maintenance difficulty were large quantities of sub-standard jet fuel that
caused AV-8B Harrier turbo-fans to become pitted, requiring premature replacement.
Some of these problems are preventable, while some are unforeseeable. In either case,
the cost of maintenance can increase significantly beyond predictions.
5. Problems with Navy Working Capital Funds
The costs of Navy Working Capital Funds, incorporated into the OP-20 budget
since 1986, began to skyrocket as NAVSUP (Commander, Naval Supply) began to have
problems generating enough cashflow to remain legally solvent. As a result, the cost of
overhead applied to aviation parts and depot level services rose. Analysts are technically
correct in claiming that this increased cost should not affect aviation readiness because it
is factored into OP-20 pricing at the beginning of the Fiscal Year. However, only enough
funds to cover the engineering estimate of parts expected to fail is factored into the
formula. Therefore, if an expensive part fails more often than predicted, the end result is
the loss of Flying Hour Program funding to pay higher surcharges. [Ref. 61]
6. Operational Tempo
Despite the end of the Cold War and success in the Persian Gulf, the operational
tempo for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft has remained high. The result is increased
aircraft wear, and difficulty in maintaining manning levels necessary to keep aircraft
flying. Personnel cut as part of the defense drawdown reduced the number of Marines
available to maintain aircraft. The end result is higher maintenance costs, less efficiency,
and increased cannibalization to keep aircraft flying.
The cumulative effect of all these problems has meant that by 1995, Marine
Aviation units had difficulty keeping their primary authorized number of aircraft flying.
The effects of not having the correct number of aircraft flying resulted in an under-
execution of flying hours, which caused the OP-20 budget formula for Marine units to be
underexecuted. The effect of underexecuting the OP-20 is that Marine squadrons risk not
receiving the full amount of maintenance funding needed to maintain their aircraft.
Reduction in executed flight hours resulted in Marine Aircraft Wings having the choice
of either underexecuting hours and not receiving the money that they needed to repair
aircraft, or overflying the aircraft that were in ready condition, causing a continually
increasing backlog of maintenance difficulties and an ever increasing spiral of deadlined
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aircraft. Within MARFORLANT specifically within 2nd MAW, the number of hours
flown continued to decline and aircraft accumulated more maintenance discrepancies,
causing unsafe conditions. In 1996, the CG of 2nd MAW, Major General Ryan, stopped
trying to attain Flying Hour Program goals for safety reasons. [Ref. 62] Figure 3.9
shows the Flight Hour Execution Rate at 2nd MAW during the past five years and
illustrates the increasing program costs with a significantly decreased PMR beginning in
1996.
TOTAL NON-FHP PMR
1994 128,899 2,217 $287M $13.3M 83%
1995 136,408 2,384 $331M $18.3M 84%
1996 121,795 2,531 $317M S16.8M 79%
1997 97,893 2,880 $282M S13.4M 59%
1998 100,582 3,600 $366M S12.6M 71%
Figure 3.9. Historical FHP Execution Data at 2nd MAW
E. THE MARINE AVIATION CAMPAIGN PLAN
Before the AMSR working group met, Marine Corps leaders saw that the
readiness death spiral had to be halted. "The Marine Corps recognized that in order to
maintain and fly their given fleet of aged aircraft some fundamental changes to the way
the aircraft were being flown and maintained must be done. With this in mind the Marine
Corps adopted the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan" [Ref. 63]. The MACP "was
specifically designed to maximize aviation combat readiness and increase the overall
combat capability of Marine Aviation." [Ref. 64] In the words of General Terrence
Dake, who was the Marine Chief of Staff for Aviation Plans and Policy during the
adoption of the MACP, the status quo was "no longer an option." [Ref. 65] By stating
the problems facing Marine Aviation as part of fiscal, manpower, and logistical require-
ments, the Marine Corps hoped to better use and allocate its resources, and to improve
readiness at the tactical unit level. (Wing, Group, Squadron)
In broad terms, this attempt at improving the way Marine Aviation achieved
readiness was to be accomplished through the preservation of Marine Corps assets
(equipment AND personnel), reduction of overall operational tempo, and a balancing of
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resources against requirements. Figure 3.10 shows the revised MACP divided into six
major categories with their associated goals.
A survey of the MACP shows that nearly every goal affects the Marine Corps
Flying Hour Program. From the perspective of the MARFORLANT Aviation Budget
Officer, the changes for the Flying Hour Program were a drastic departure from the
unwritten standards of the FHP. Commanders at tactical unit levels would no longer try
to plan operations by trying to accommodate FHP flight hour goals. They would plan by
sortie instead of flight hour, with the philosophy that a decrease in hours flown with an
increased emphasis on the quality of flight training would not decrease overall readiness.
This deemphasis of the pursuit of a flying hour goal would simplify the operational
planning process, maintain a ready force, and preserve aircraft assets. Finally, in an
agreement with USMC Aviation Plans and Policies, the projected savings from reduced
flight time would be reprogrammed into the acquisition of more and better simulators to
supplement the loss in actual flight hours.
Topic Category Goal
1. Aviation Manning Enlisted Manning 1. Man Units at 90% ofT/O
2. Increase "Top Six " Structure
(E4-E9)from 64% to 70% of
Aviation Enlisted Force
Officer Manning 1. Pilot Resignations<40 Year
2. Naval Aviator 1. Undergraduate "Pool " Time not
Time to Train to Exceed 3 Months
2. FRS "Pool " Time not to exceed 2
months
3. FRS Time-to-Train w/in 10% of
Programmed Time
4. Aviator Street-to-Fleet w/in 10%
ofProgrammed Time
3. Flying Hour 1. Avg Minimum of 12-15
Program Sorties/Month/Aircrew
2. Execute Flying Hour Program
within 2% ofSortie Based
Projections

















Program and Fund a Simulator
Master Plan with FHP savings
Increase Simulator Usage per
Training and Readiness Manuals
with a CRP (Combat Readiness
Percentage) Credit
Revise T & R goals to focus on
unit core competencies rather
than high-risk missions
Maintain minimum Squadron
Core Capability per T & R
Manual
Execute planned TEEP rather
than changing schedules on short
notice
Integrate MCTEEP at
Battalion/Squadron level to get a
true reflection ofOPTEMPO.
Carefullyfactor in more planned
operational pauses.
Aircraft Utilization Rates should
be less than Weapons System
Planning Document rates.
No loss ofannual leavefor
Marines.
I. Implement a new Risk
Management Process to help
improve risk vs. benefit analysis.
1.
2.





Deployed Squadrons have 100%
ofPrimary Authorized Aircraft
Meet or Exceed 73%/56%for
MC/FMC Rates
Complete SDLM cycles within
10% ofProgrammed Time
10% Increase in Man-Hours




This chapter described the organizational context and problems that concern the
MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer. It provides the information necessary to
understand aviation finance at MARFORLANT, and provides the background necessary
for the quantitative and qualitative analysis that will follow in the next two chapters.
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PRESENTATION OF DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of Chapter IV is to describe the methodology used to analyze the
Flying Hour Program at MARFORLANT and to present the quantitative cost data
collected from AIRLANT, MARFORLANT, and 2nd MAW archives. The research
methodology section of the chapter focuses on a brief review of linear regression
techniques. The presentation of data section discusses how the cost information was
adjusted prior to analysis. Sample spreadsheets present excerpts of the collected cost
data. However, because of the size of the database, spreadsheets with all the cost data
used in the analysis are contained in Appendix B.
B. COST ESTIMATION USING PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS
Arkley described three main quantitative methods that are commonly used for
cost prediction in business and government: the analogy method, the engineering method,
and the parametric method. The analogy method compares relationships from a known
system and transfers them to a previously unanalyzed system. Analogous cost estimates
are prepared by identifying key characteristics from known systems and comparing them
to similar characteristics of newer systems. This method can be useful when there is little
data to generate estimates about a new system of relationships. However, the method is
also dependent on the relationships between the two systems remaining constant in the
future, which is rare in any dynamic environment. [Ref. 66]
The engineering method is a more comprehensive cost estimating technique,
"based on an extensive knowledge of all the component costs and relationships affecting
the total or final system cost. This method relies exclusively on definitive knowledge of
all factors affecting cost, their relationships and their magnitudes. It is built on the
assumption that future data relationships and their effect on cost are predictable and
quantifiable from historical data on the components." [Ref. 67] This method is
frequently used in attempting to build cost estimates for parts and sub-components of
equipment, but is often too costly and time consuming for programs as large as the FHP.
'"Parametric methods, such as regression analysis, "seek to define in mathematical
terms all or part of the cause-and-effect relationships between two or more character-
istics." This mathematical formula is usually based on deriving a trendline which best
represents the overall relationship between a series of data points between independent
and dependent variables within a relevant range. The formula from the derived line can
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then represent the relationship in a future forecast, especially when the forecast is
interpolated within the already established range of the analysis. [Ref. 68]
Like the analogy and engineering method, a basic assumption of a forecast using
parametric methods is that the basic relationship between variables will not change in the
future. Of the three methods surveyed the parametric method best fits the analysis of a
complex program such as the FHP, because it can usually produce a good estimate of the
future with reasonable accuracy and timeliness. The analogy method is not suitable
because the Flying Hour Program already has extensive data from which to conduct
analyses. Likewise, the engineering method may be more precise, but is still dependent
on engineering estimates of the "mean time between failure" (MTBF) of thousands of
aviation components. Therefore the engineering method is more likely to produce an
unworkable or unwieldy model for a dynamic program such as the FHP. For this reason,
this thesis uses parametric analysis as the primary method for understanding
MARFORLANT FHP cost behavior.
1. Fundamentals of Linear Regression
As stated in Chapter II, the Flying Hour Program has been analyzed repeatedly
using parametric methods in an attempt to understand its cost behavior, and to validate
assumptions about the relationship between flight hours and program costs. In this thesis,
regression and correlation analysis are the primary parametric techniques used to deduce
whether aviation cost behavior at MARFORLANT is consistent with previous research
already conducted by Byrne, Arkley, and NCCA.
Regression can be used to define linear, curvilinear, exponential or logarithmic
relationships. A scatter diagram of data points plotted between one or more independent
variables (X) and a dependent variable (Y) usually represents these relationships. Often
times the difficulty of the analysis lies in the transformation of the data into a representa-
tive linear relationship. However, when this is successfully accomplished, the regression
line "expresses the best average relationship between the dependent variable and indepen-
dent variable to a series of observations... so that the line lies at the center of the range of
observations." This thesis uses the most common method of deriving the regression line:
the least squares method. The least squares method determines the values of the slope
and the y-intercept of the line, so that the sum of the squared deviations between the
observations and the fitted line is less than that from any other straight line that could be
fitted through the observations. [Ref. 69] In this thesis, the independent variable (X) is
most frequently the number of flight hours, while the dependent variable is the expected
value of the formula (Y
c), which is most often one of the flying hour cost pools. In its
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= a + bX
The expected value of Y means that the dependent variable that can be forecasted from
the regression equation is only the average of many possibilities based on the size of the
random error (also called residuals) within the equation. This random error is generally
called e. Therefore the "actual observed value of the dependent variable, Y
a ,
may or may
not be exactly the same as the expected average value expressed by the regression line."
[Ref. 70] For example, if flight hours were used to predict total cost for some element of
the FHP, the actual value of total cost would follow this form:
Total Cost = Expected Total Cost ± e = a + b(Flight Hours) + e
In other words, the actual total cost achieved through the regression forecast is equal to
the expected total cost (Y
c ) plus or minus the random error for the equation. The symbol
"a" is equal to the value of the y intercept. The symbol "b" is the slope of the regression
line.
When a regression line is derived using the least squares method, both Microsoft
Excel and Minitab have several statistical outputs which help the researcher to understand
the accuracy of the formula describing the relationship, and the strength of that relation-
ship. Together these describe the "statistical significance" and "goodness of fit" of the
regression line. In addition, there are several statistics and analytical tests that help
determine whether the data has correctly met the assumptions inherent to proper
regression analysis. Figure 4.1 is a sample output from MINITAB to help describe these
statistics.
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The regression equation is
TOTAL COST = 712505 + 1608 HOURS
Predictor Coef St Dev T P
Constant 712505 175720 4.05 0.000
HOURS 1607.5 212.7 7.56 0.000
S = 629536 R-Sq = 37.8% R-Sq(adj) = 37.1%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 2.26300E+13 2.26300E+13 57.1 0.000
Residual Er 94 3.72536E+13 3.96315E+11
Lack of Fit 92 3.67743E+13 3.99721E+11 1.67 0.449
Pure Error 2 4.79305E+11 2.39653E+11
Total 95 5.98837E+13
92 rows with no replicates
Unusual Observations
Obs HOURS TOTAL COST Fit StDev Fit Residual St. Resid
17 1474 2804501 3081999 163197 -277498 -0.46X
27 864 3754692 2101408 67367 1653285 2.64R
Figure 4.1. Sample Regression Results from MINITAB
Included in Figure 4.1 are most of the key statistics that help the analyst to
determine both the nature of the relationship between the two variables and the strength
of that relationship. At the top, the regression equation is listed, substituting X and Y for
the names of the independent and dependent variables. The coefficients for both the y-
intercept or a ($712505) and the slope or b (1608 * Hours) are listed.
These coefficients are accompanied by statistics that describe the goodness of fit
of the regression: the standard error of the estimate or S, and the coefficient of determina-
tion or R2 . The standard error of the estimate, S
e ,
is the square root of the sum of the
squared differences between the estimated Y value represented by the regression line and
the observed value, (Y
a
- Y
c), divided by the number of degrees of freedom. The
equation is shown below:
s. = "V XDIa^Yj!
(n-2)
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"The standard error is a measurement of the typical vertical distance from the sample data
points to the regression line. If the error terms are normally distributed around the
regression line, the standard error of the estimate can be used to examine the dispersion of
data points around the regression line and assess the goodness of fit of the model." [Ref.
71]
The R2 and adjusted R2 statistics also help determine goodness of fit by examining
the strength of the regression relationship. In this case, the strength of the relationship is
determined by correlation analysis of the X and Y variables. The square root of R, (or
simply R) is the coefficient of correlation and "and provides a relative measure of the
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable. If there is a
perfect relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable, no
error term exists and the standard error of the estimate would be 0, i.e., S e = 0." [Ref. 72]




However, this description of a perfect versus imperfect relationship is counter intuitive.
Therefore, the value S
e
is subtracted from one to produce R. (1-S
e
= R) When R=l, the
regression line traces through the center of each data point on a scatter diagram. In
addition, the R-value can be positive, signifying a direct relationship between X and Y, or
negative, signifying an inverse relationship. (This is also found by looking at the sign of
the slope of the line). While R represents the correlation between the X and Y variables,
R2 represents the percentage of the sample variation from the mean of the dependent
variable that can be explained by the change in the independent variable for the data
relationship being analyzed. [Ref. 73] In Figure 4.1, the R2 is 37.8%. This means that
approximately 38% of the relationship between TOTAL COST and FLIGHT HOURS
can be explained by the regression equation. Conversely this also means that 62% of the
relationship between TOTAL COST and FLIGHT HOURS is unexplained. As a result,
the regression equation in Figure 4.1 would likely produce inaccurate results if used in
forecasting. Often times regression is performed with data sets that are too small to
eliminate the possibility that what is observed in the statistics is just a random occurrence.
The Adjusted R2 statistic compensates for this by recomputing the R2 to account for the
number of degrees of freedom in the data set. In many cases of the analysis performed on
AIRLANT cost data within the thesis, the number of observations are frequently less than
or equal to n=7. In these cases the Adjusted R2 is presented rather than R2 .
Sometimes the R2 or Adjusted R2 statistics produce ambiguous results. For
example, in Figure 4.1 an analyst most likely would be unsure whether the R2 of 38% was
statistically significant or not. In practical terms this is like asking the cliche question, "Is
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the glass half empty or half full?" To answer this, several statistical measures can be
used to interpret the relationship. These measures also use probability and relative
measures of the standard deviation to show statistical significance. Thus, the analysis
results are significant when these measures show that the results were most likey not a
random occurrence. Three measures displayed in Figure 4.1 can be used to deter-mine
the statistical significance of the regression line: the t-ratio, the F-ratio, and the p-value.
The t-ratio (T) helps determine "if the value of the slope, b, is significantly
different from zero." [Ref. 74] In addition, it is used to judge whether the constant at the
y-intercept, a, is also statistically significant as part of the equation. T-ratio is determined
by dividing the "coefficient" by the "standard deviation" for the slope or constant being
analyzed. "A high t-value indicates that the independent variable is important in explain-
ing the value of the dependent variable. Generally, t-values of greater than two are
desired except when the sample size is small, which requires higher t-values." [Ref. 75]
The F-ratio also helps to determine the statistical significance of the regression
line. More importantly, it can also aid in determining whether a low R2
,
such as the
percentage in Figure 4.1, is significant. In the example, the F-ratio by its larger number
(57.10) shows that the slope of the line and the R2 are statistically significant and not just
the result of a random deviation.
Finally, the p-value also can be used instead of the t-ratio or F-ratio to answer the
question of statistical significance. The p-value represents the statistical probability that
the results shown for a particular statistic are simple a random occurrence. In the case of
the t-ratio, it's the probability that the regression results are just a random deviation from
the null hypothesis that the slope of the equation is zero. In this thesis all null hypotheses
will be analyzed using a 95% confidence level. Therefore, the a (the alpha), or chance
that the results are a random occurrence will be .05. When interpreting the p-value in
regression results, a p-value of less than .05, is interpreted by stating that there is less than
five percent probability that the statistic is just a random deviation from the null
hypothesis. Therefore, when the p-value is less than .05 we may reject the null
hypothesis that the slope of the line is zero or the constant is merely a random occurrence.
Together, these statistics along with the analyst's judgment, help determine
whether a regression model is useful for explaining the relationship or for future fore-
casting. Before making a final conclusion about a regression line, however, the analyst
must still determine whether the data correctly fulfill the assumptions of regression
analysis. This is one problem commonly seen today with regression analysis, especially
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because this statistical tool is so widely available. When conducted properly, regression
analysis should fulfill five basic assumptions:
Linearity
Normality of Error Distribution
Constant Variance (Homoscedasticity)
Zero Expected Value of Errors
Independence of Error Terms
Linearity is the assumption that the dependent variable is linearly related to the
independent variable. Although regression can be conducted for non-linear relationships,
the manipulation of non-linear data into linear form increases the complexity of the
model and the ease with which the relationship can be used to explain and forecast
reality. This assumption can be checked by plotting X versus Y on a scatter diagram for
each relationship and by using MINITAB's Pure Error Lack of Fit Test or the
Experimental Lack of Fit Test to determine the possibility that there is a possible
curvature in the data.
Normality of error distribution implies that the distribution of error terms
(residuals) for each value of Y around each value of X fits a normal distribution.
Absence of normality of error would be an indicator that the error terms are the result of a
specific outside factor, which has not been considered in the model. If the error terms are
not random within a normal distribution, the regression may be inaccurate because of
averages that skew the data from its actual relationship. This assumption can be checked
by using techniques for residual analysis. [Ref. 76]
Constant variance or homoscedasticity means that in addition to a normal
distribution of errors, the variation of errors is also constant for all values of X, meaning
that Y varies the same for a high input value or X or a low input value of X. This is
important to rule out the possibility that there is a relationship between the variables that
is being overlooked. In addition, a lack of constant variance can mean that the forecast is
suspect at one or both ends of the relevant range ofX data. Again, this assumption can be
tested through residual analysis. [Ref. 77]
Finally, independence of error terms means that the residuals from the regression
are independent from each other. "This means that each error term value is independent
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of those values coming before and after it. In technical terminology, when this
assumption is violated, it is said that serial correlation (or autocorrelation) exists among
successive residual values. This assumption is most commonly violated when
observations are drawn periodically over time." [Ref. 78] The Durbin-Watson test can
be conducted to test for first-order autocorrelation. This test is "a summary measure of
the amount of serial correlation in the error terms. With uncorrelated errors, the Durbin-
Watson statistic takes on values near 2. If the errors are perfectly and positively
correlated, the D-W statistic will be 0." [Ref. 79] The D-W statistic needs to be carefully
interpreted since it has a range where the statistic is inconclusive.
Residual analysis is an important analytical step that must be conducted before the
regression results are presented and interpreted. An explanation of specific techniques for
analyzing residuals is not presented in this thesis. However, the techniques used for
residual analysis include residual vs. fit plots (where the residuals (e) are plotted against
the expected values of Y) and residual vs. explanatory variable plots (where residuals are
plotted against the explanatory variable(s) (X)) in order to determine the source of a
possible violation of assumptions. [Ref. 80]
2. Time-Series Analysis and Lagged Regression
One of the problems with analyzing cost data in the Flying Hour Program is that
there is a tendency for the data to be auto-correlated when it is collected monthly,
annually, or yearly. If the effects of the autocorrelated data are not recognized, these
relationships of time can violate the regression assumption of serial independence. The
effect of unanalyzed autocorrelation on the dependent variable can be a time lag in which
the data acts "sticky" (i.e., dependent variable does not immediately respond to changes
in the independent variable), because it was "relevant in explaining the behavior of the
dependent variable but was ignored in a regression equation." [Ref. 81] Therefore, the
analyst should be aware of the possible ways to account for the effects of time in his
analysis, and know how to identify the true relationship between the variables. In this
thesis two techniques which recognize the effect of time on data are used. The first is
time-series analysis, which is used in a limited fashion in order to adjust data and make
comparisons with other analyses. The second is lagged regression, which is used to
search for time lags in the relationship between flight hours, and the recording of
maintenance costs.
A time-series is, "a set of numerical data that is obtained at regular periods of
time." [Ref. 82] In effect, all the data presented in this thesis can be presented in a time
series. Understanding basic time-series techniques allows the adjustment of FHP data so
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that the true relationship of the cost data is accurately defined. Data presented in a time-
series can be analyzed strictly in relation to time as the independent variable by substitut-
ing the unit of time with an ordinal numbering sequence (i.e., Jan 1995=1, Feb 1995=2,
Mar 1995=3, etc.). Like regression of random variables, a linear or non-linear relation-
ship can be established using several methods, including the least squares regression
method. Ideally, once time trends are removed from the data and a regression line is
fitted, the trendline should represent the true nature of the relationship.
The classical decomposition time-series model seeks to isolate four different
component factors within time-series data. These factors are trends, seasonality, cycles,
and irregular variations. Trends are persistent long-term upward or downward patterns of
movement, such as the tendency for the flying hour program to increase in cost despite
fewer hours and lower inflation rates. Seasonality is a periodic, regular fluctuation of the
data in the same way over time. Cyclical data is repeated up and down swings of data
that does not necessarily follow a particular time cycle, such as economic fluctuations
over time. Irregular fluctuations are unpredictable and nonrepeating variations in the data
once trends, seasonality, and cycles have been removed.
Other time series models process time-series data in different ways. For example,
moving averages or exponential smoothing are often used to replace data with cycles and
fluctuation with a more constant trendline. This seems to be precisely the technique that
the Special Assistant to the Flying Hour Program formerly used in trying to build the
correct Cost Per Hour into the OP-20 model.
Lagged regression is a technique that attempts to explain a delay in the outcome
of the dependent variable after the occurrence of the independent variable. The result is
that the dependent variable data is adjusted in time to align it with the correct value of the
explanatory variable. [Ref. 83] Arkley cited this type of relationship in his analysis of
Intermediate Level and Depot Level Maintenance cost data. He noted lagged relation-
ships between hours flown by the aircraft and the repair of major components that had to
be shipped to another location or required a long period of time to repair. This thesis
looks for similar tendencies in MARFORLANT cost data. Another example might be the
time lag caused by administrative delays in data entry, although most units have internal
control measures which would prevent these from being recorded more than one or two
months after a maintenance action's occurrence. To uncover lagged relationships in this
thesis, monthly cost data is lagged up to 6 months from the date of execution of the flight
hours. Annual data may also be lagged by one year in order to uncover more accurate
trendlines.
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These are the essential concepts behind the parametric analysis that is conducted
in this thesis. The next section describes the actual quantitative methodology used in the
thesis.
C. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Chapter I stated that one of the ways to answer the primary research question for
this thesis was to analyze MARFORLANT FHP cost data in comparison with several




Fuel costs showed some correlation to flight hours, but 25 to 75 percent of
the relationship between the two variables was unexplained. (Byrne)
2. Fuel and OMA costs fit significantly when analyzing the variable
relationship between flight hours and these cost pools. (Arkley)
3. Fuel costs showed a variable relationship with flight hours, consumables
showed a fixed plus variable relationship, while AVDLR costs did not
show any significant relationship to number of hours and was modeled as
a fixed cost. (NCCA)
4. Maintenance costs for parts showed no correlation to flight hours, and was
assumed to be a fixed cost of operations. (Byrne)
5. IMA costs often show less statistical significance when regressed versus
flight hours because of maintenance time lags and work that can be
repaired by other commands at other locations. (Arkley)
6. DLR cost can show strong statistical significance, if data is adjusted
properly. (Arkley)
7. Regression analysis can yield a statistically significant relationship which
reflects total cost vs. flight hours at the Department of the Navy level.
(NCCA)
8. Comparisons of NCCA model versus OP-20 POM predictions for budget
outyears showed that the Department of the Navy was underestimating the
future cost of the program. (NCCA)
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These benchmarks were combined to build a set of five hypotheses for
MARFORLANT cost data. Regression analysis is used to gather evidence that supports
or rejects these hypotheses.
An important fact to be remembered about regression is that correlation is not
causation, and outcomes containing a high correlation and statistical significance do not
necessarily prove a hypothesis. Therefore, analysts commonly create a corollary to the
research hypothesis stating that there is no relationship between an independent and
dependent variable. This is called a null hypothesis. When properly conducted,
regression analysis allows us to accept or reject a null hypothesis. For example:
although, an analyst might believe that fuel costs vary directly with flight hours, the
correct null hypothesis in response to this belief is that "there is no relationship between
fuel cost and flight hours." If the analysis shows results with a p-value of less than .05,
the analyst can only correctly state that there is sufficient evidence to reject the null
hypothesis. In other words, the analyst is more than 95% confident that the null
hypothesis is false. Using this method, the five research hypotheses all have correspond-
ing null hypotheses. The intent of the regression analysis is to search for evidence that
allows us to reject the null hypothesis. These results, combined with qualitative evidence
about MARFORLANT cost data, should allow us to draw conclusions in support of the
research questions. The five hypotheses are presented below, with each corresponding
null hypothesis.
a. Fuel Costs
H.l . Fuel costs for MARFORLANT FHP cost data vary directly to flight hours
and will show a high coefficient of determination, when analyzed both at
the aggregate level and at the T/M/S level.
H.2. Null Hypothesis: Fuel costs show no relationship to Flight Hours.
b. Flight Equipment Costs
H.3. Flight Equipment (OFC-01 Code 7F) costs for MARFORLANT FHP are
fixed and show no relationship to flight hours.
H.4. Null Hypothesis: Flight Equipment costs show no relationship to Flight
Hours.
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c. Organizational and Intermediate Maintenance Costs (MNT)
H.5. Organizational and Intermediate Maintenance costs at MARFORLANT
FHP cost data vary directly to flight hours with an additional fixed price
component.
H.6. Null Hypothesis: Maintenance costs shows no relationship to Flight
Hours.
d. Aviation Depot Level Repairable Costs (DLR)
H.7. Aviation Depot Level Repairable costs are a fixed cost and show no
correlation to flight hours.
. H.8. Null Hypothesis: Maintenance costs shows no relationship to Flight
Hours.
e. Total FHP Costs
H.9. Flight Hour Program Total Costs have a fixed plus variable cost structure
in relation to flight hours.
H.10. Null Hypothesis: Flight Hour Program Total costs show no relationship
to Flight Hours.
The testing of these hypotheses was conducted at two levels where cost
data relevant to MARFORLANT were available. The first level of analysis was
conducted on cost data found in AIRLANT's Flying Hour Cost Reports that show actual
year end figures on the quantity of hours flown and costs within the Fuel, Maintenance
and Aviation Depot Level Repairables cost pools. AIRLANT reconciles these annual
reports with the Defense Finance Accounting Service, and conveniently categorizes them
in an OP-20 format with aggregate data by service, T/M/S, and major Flying Hour
Program category. AIRLANT annual cost data analyzed included aggregates by
AIRLANT, by Marine TACAIR, by Marine Fleet Air Training, and by the F/A-18, AV-
8B, CH-46E, and CH-53E aircrafts. Although the cost reports are published by
AIRLANT, they seemed to be the best and simplest source of cost data available which
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could reveal aggregate trends in the most important MARFORLANT categories. None of
the aggregate data are compiled into a MARFORLANT comprehensive cost pool because
it would only mask the true behavior of each category, and still gives the best
understanding of the aggregate trends of the most significant MARFORLANT FHP costs.
In addition to providing information about the historical trends and financial condition of
the Flying Hour Program at MARFORLANT, this level of analysis is similar to the type
of data analyzed by NCCA.
Since both Arkley and Byrne conducted FHP cost analysis at the aircraft
type level, a second level of analysis was conducted by aircraft type on 2nd MAW cost
data. Arkley's F-18 data showed a high degree of correlation and statistical significance
in comparison to Byrne's analysis, and that ofNCCA. To explore the possibility that this
may have occurred because aggregate data masks the true nature of individual aircraft
cost behavior, the analysis was conducted on information pulled directly from a 2nd MAW
cost database named DOLARS. DOLARS is a local database designed by a former
Marine turned analyst using Microsoft FOXPRO. DOLARS collects monthly data
through unit Budget OPTAR Reports (BOR reports), that are one of the principal
reporting mechanisms through which FHP data is collected and eventually reported up
the entire budgeting chain of command. Rather than reanalyzing annual data from 2nd
MAW that is inherent in the AIRLANT Flying Hour Cost Reports, DOLARS allows a
collection of monthly cost data closer to its source. Three types of aircraft were selected
at 2nd MAW for regression analysis using methods similar to Arkley. The F/A-18A, F/A-
18C, and F/A-18D were selected to facilitate a direct comparison with Arkley's analysis
of Navy and Marine Corps Reserve F/A-18s. In addition, the AV-8B Harrier II, and the
CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter were selected for comparison of cost behavior with the
F/A-18. The Harrier II was selected because it is the only other tactical attack fixed wing
aircraft in the Marine Corps' current inventory. Also, the fuel required using Vertical/
Short Take Off and Landing capability might provide an interesting comparison of fuel
costs with the F-18. The CH-46E was chosen not only because it is a helicopter, but also
because it is near the end of its service life and might provide interesting results in the
Maintenance and DLR cost pools.
Regardless of the outcome of the quantitative analysis performed on these
data, the results should help to answer the research question: "What are the historical
trends of flying hour program budgeting and execution at MARFORLANT?" In
addition, it should add insight to the research questions about MARFORLANT budgeting
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dynamics, and future budgeting adjustments needed in order to successfully meet the
goals of the MACP.
D. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary research question of this thesis is still qualitative. How should the
Flying Hour Program at MARFORLANT be managed to maximize its value to Marine
Aviation? Many ideas implicit in the answer have already been discussed through
Chapters II and III. However complex the budgeting and execution process seems, or
how well the statistical results of the regression are presented, the Flying Hour Program
manager still must decide the best way to manage the FHP at his level without
jeopardizing the operational and logistical health of the Marine Aviation. To answer that
question and also the remaining secondary research questions of the thesis, archival
research was conducted by collecting documents and conducting interviews with key
personnel involved with the FHP at 2nd MAW, MARFORLANT, and AIRLANT.
The unique methodology of this thesis is that these data will be presented in terms
of Simons' Levers of Control presented in Chapter II. The intent of using Simons'
model is to recognize the inherent tensions of conflicting priorities and processes in the
FHP, and to understand how they should be balanced.
E. PRESENTATION OF QUANTITATIVE DATA
1. AIRLANT Flying Hour Cost Reports
The AIRLANT Flying Hour Cost Report models N-88's OP-20 format for the
reporting of annual FHP cost data. Costs are broken down by Program Element and
Program Element Number such as TACAIR (Navy or Marine) by totals of all aircraft
within the category or TACAIR by individual Type/Model/Series. A typical cost
' reporting line includes the same categories reviewed for the OP-20 in Chapter II such as
Forces (# of aircraft in the category), Hours, Cost Per Hour Categories (Fuel, AVDLR,
Maintenance, Total), and Annual Cost Categories (Fuel, AVDLR, Maintenance, Total).
In addition, AIRLANT prepares cost reports that include and exclude free fuel. Since
deployed forces occasionally operate in contingency areas with fuel paid for by other
nations.
Since Chapter II mentioned that cost does not always vary directly with the
number of Flight Hours, the data extracted from these reports for analysis used only the
annual cost categories. This aggregate cost data were entered into Microsoft EXCEL
spreadsheets for analysis and sorted by type. Data from 1992 to 1998 are presented.
Data prior to 1 992 was not used because of the unusual costs of the Persian Gulf War and
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the different budgeting dynamics in effect during the Cold War. Several examples of raw
aggregate data presented prior to adjustment or analysis is presented in Figure 4.2. The
entire data used in analysis from AIRLANT is in Appendix B.
2. 2ndMAW Cost Data
The 2nd MAW DOLARS is capable of producing complex arrangements of cost
and flight hour data in a variety of forms. Data can be sorted by T/M/S, by FHP
category, by squadron, group, or by the wing as a whole. In addition, data can be
extracted for units on overseas deployment cycles. Flight Hour records can be compared
with the budgeted flight hours, and can be sorted in a variety of ways as well. The
advantage of this is the visibility 2nd MAW gains on local events and trends. However,
because the data is broken down into so many categories, only cost and flight hour data
from TACAIR and Fleet Replacement Squadron Aircraft for the types analyzed were
compiled into a MICROSOFT EXCEL spreadsheet. Figure 4.3 presents a sample of cost
data from this database. Again, the entire data used in analysis from AIRLANT is in
Appendix B.
3. Adjustment of Cost Data
The regression analysis section of this chapter pointed out that data arranged in a
time-series must be normalized to separate the true regression relationship from known
cycles of time, which affect the data. For this thesis, there were three possible variations
of data adjustment that could be used to normalize the data.
The first choice is to adjust all cost data by a simple general inflation index
applied to all Department of the Navy Operations and Maintenance funds. This strategy
would have the least amount of impact on the raw data and would strip out a long-term
trend of very slow inflation of prices. The effect on the cost figures would be minimal,
thus the relationships between cost pools and flight hours is still very similar to the data
in its nominal form.
The second choice is to adjust each cost pool by its own more appropriate
inflation index. Fuel costs would be adjusted by a fuel escalation index found in
NAVCOMPT 7111 budget guidance. This index accounts for annual price changes in
fuel costs, and has a much stronger effect on the fuel cost pool. The remaining categories
of cost, Flight Equipment (in the case of 2nd MAW), Aviation Fleet Maintenance (MNT),
and Aviation Depot Level Repairables would all still be adjusted by the Operations and
Maintenance Cost Escalation Index also found in versions of NAVCOMPT 7111. This
method would account for obvious differences in the price of fuel, while keeping the
adjustment of maintenance costs simple and relatively similar to the data in raw form.
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YEAR TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 593099 $269,531 $293,966 $455,087 $1,018,584
1993 545837 $235,904 $294,273 $502,435 $1,032,612
1994 498344 $267,356 $254,009 $529,836 $1,051,201
1995 498344 $233,529 $284,962 $678,536 $1,197,027
1996 479171 $243,083 $294,651 $551,896 $1,089,630
1997 427110 $223,692 $288,295 $561,374 $1,073,361
1998 428330 $261,368 $323,007 $785,627 $1,370,002
AIRLANT Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data (in millions of nominal $)
YEAR TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 125,418 $53,159 $74,162 $101,471 $228,792
1993 113,587 $46,313 $68,017 $112,599 $226,929
1994 112,137 $58,492 $62,923 $128,637 $250,052
1995 120,021 $58,840 $79,041 $161,648 $299,529
1996 104,488 $55,464 $88,222 $135,217 $278,903
1997 80,983 $41,710 $75,990 $115,972 $233,672
1998 84,572 $47,857 $87,209 $177,485 $312,551
Marine TACAIR Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data (in millions of nominal $)
YEAR TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 17102 $7,320 $8,741 $9,005 $25,066
1993 16268 $6,705 $8,850 $15,047 $30,602
1994 16762 $8,469 $7,422 $14,932 $30,823
1995 16762 $6,697 $8,196 $16,874 $31,767
1996 17307 $6,970 $11,140 $18,040 $36,150
1997 16909 $5,981 $10,653 $19,905 $36,539
1998 16010 $6,328 $14,092 $27,201 $47,620
Marine Fleet Replacement Squadron Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data
(in millions of nominal $)
YEAR TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 21775 $10,989 $15,407 $14,644 $41,040
1993 17936 $8,725 $14,346 $26,086 $49,157
1994 16158 $8,932 $9,920 $24,140 $42,992
1995 17213 $8,356 $11,599 $28,926 $48,881
1996 14745 $7,850 $11,111 $24,877 $43,838
1997 10019 $5,081 $12,297 $25,604 $42,982
1998 9503 $5,722 $15,266 $32,638 $53,626
Marine AV-8B (TACAIR only) Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data
(in millions of nominal $)
Figure 4.2. Aggregate Annual Cost Data from AIRLANT Flying Hour Cost Reports
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MONTH YEAR TYPE UNIT TOT HRS 7B(FUEL) 7F (FLT E) 7L (AFM) 9S(DLR)
OCT 1993 AV-8B MAG-14 1502 404377 17656 983726 1208841
NOV 1993 AV-8B MAG-14 1587 1387808 20444 1065726 3993832
DEC 1993 AV-8B MAG-14 1265 940714 23271 1038230 2011457
JAN 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1339 821546 34987 1123930 1857766
FEB 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1348 764488 18908 917451 2404178
MAR 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1766 1035192 15315 977172 3014189
APR 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1324 1257645 140 1667121 1775139
MAY 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1531 1282844 4018 900314 2067036
JUNE 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1550 802270 12887 1166062 2290773
JULY 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1675 1373295 7372 1315474 3028675
AUG 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1026 1143338 13976 640037 2012645
SEP 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 496 683145 -7047 462133 3558266
OCT 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1561 731463 14870 1206108 3531929
NOV 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1216 923898 16474 987739 2109321
DEC 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1372 465518 18933 1008006 2261507
JAN 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1593 868581 23474 774113 3029540
FEB 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1391 1211281 14637 914386 3713828















JUNE 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1125" 842855 5251 293291 2172306
JULY 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1345 999299 46697 1284104 1605842
AUG 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1010 893291 14789 909028 2257422
SEP 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1296 874066 42131 800951 1582533
OCT 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1650 741812 23514 972789 3414815
NOV 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1554 555970 6925 911972 1793780
DEC 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1822 981330 21635 791611 1333825
JAN 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 1667 895739 15246 983082 2230832
FEB 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 2115 933669 15782 854062 2761881
MAR 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 1416 392216 6326 1196282 2442672
APR 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 1464 867922 18769 1221727 2595214
MAY 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 1423 1063056 13899 1309351 2246438
JUNE 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 1423 1489109 26439 1449470 2195582






















NOV 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 540 219499 8573 870316 1918145
DEC 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 534 410435 5564 759340 1723215
JAN 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1162 470013 10323 895926 2515425
FEB 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 898 896546 15681 1313721 3625735
MAR 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1206 312922 5486 1306360 3936498
APR 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1135 645481 5030 984683 3411195
MAY 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1056 815032 13496 985694 1815020
JUNE 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 843 318581 7859 951949 2185724
JULY 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1067 525445 12793 1037602 346127
AUG 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 992 429274 7833 1063585 1133512
SEP 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 715 816134 4707 822263 3391960
Figure 4.3. Monthly Cost Data by T/MS from 2nd MAW Database
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The third choice for data adjustment is to adjust fuel by its NAVCOMPT 7111
index, Flight Equipment by its O&M Escalation Index, and Aviation Fleet Maintenance
and Aviation Depot Level Repairables by an index called Variable Annual Demand.
Variable Annual Demand (VAD) represents the annual price change of the Flying Hour
Program. It accounts for annual average price changes in aviation consumables and
repariables, changes in overhead rates charged by NAVSUP (surcharges), funds budgeted
in excess of the N-88 OP-20 projections because of the annual change in those
surcharges, and ordinary inflation adjustments such as the O&M Escalation Index. Using
this method means that the adjustment of raw data is more severe in changing it from its
original form. In particular, the creation of a VAD index is an "average of averages,"
[Ref. 84] meaning that it is a compilation of several different dynamic factors and may
not adjust each cost category in the same way. However, it also captures known changes
that effect the pricing of the FHP. To get the best test of the relationship and correlation
between cost pools and flight hours, these factors need to be adjusted in the raw data. In
addition, the adjustment is not as severe as Arkley's adjustment of AVDLR data for the
life cycle changes of the F-18's F-404 engine. The design and effect of price changes,
surcharges, and the VAD on the Flying Hour Program is a dynamic topic with enough
complexity to warrant its own thesis.
The Secretary of the Navy Office of the Comptroller for Budgeting (FMB)
annually publishes Budget Guidance with price escalation indices pre-computed. These
indices help in the preparation of budget estimate submissions and programming by
giving historical price and inflation changes for previous years, and projected price
changes and inflation rates for future years. Multiple indices showing price changes in
appropriation and cost categories are produced using different base years. A base year is
the fiscal year that all other years will be compared to once an index is created. Therefore
the base year is always 100% or 1.00, depending on how the analyst builds his spread-
sheet.
Figure 4.4 shows the raw inflation rates for average fuel cost and its conversion to
a percentage index using Fiscal Year 1998 as the base year:
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Year Fuel Inf Rate % Index Index/100
1992 -14.8 68.58 0.69
1993 9.6 75.17 0.75
1994 14.1 85.76 0.86
1995 -12.4 75.13 0.75
1996 5.6 79.34 0.79
1997 5.3 83.54 0.84
1998 19.7 100.00 1.00
1999 -8.8 91.20 0.91
2000 2.1 93.12 0.93
2001 2.1 95.07 0.95
2002 2.1 97.07 0.97
2003 2.1 99.11 0.99
2004 2.1 101.19 1.01
2005 2.1 103.31 1.03
Figure 4.4. Fuel Adjustment Index (Base Year 1998) [Ref. 85]
Since FY 1998 is the base year, it is automatically 100% or 1.00. The Fiscal Year
97 index is computed by dividing the current year percentage in the numerator by 1 + the
inflation rate as a percentage of 1.00 in the denominator. This yields a percentage that
can be converted to a usable index by dividing by 100. Two examples from the fuel
index are listed below.
• FY 97 Index = {Current Year FY 98/(1 + 98 Inf Rate} = {100/(1+ .197)} = 83.54
• FY 96 Index = {Current Year FY 97/(1 + 97 Inf Rate) = {83.54/(1 + .053)} = 79.34
Conversely, when building an index in the future from a base year the current year index
is multiplied by 1 + the projected next year inflation rate. Again, two examples from the
fuel index are presented below.
• FY 99 Index = {Current Year FY 98 x (1 + FY 99 Inf Rate)} = {100 x (1 + (-.088))}=
91.20
• FY 00 Index = {Current Year FY 99 x (1 + FY 00 Inf Rate)} = {91.2 x (1 + .021)}=
93.12
Figure 4.5 shows an Operations and Maintenance Adjustment Index used for the
Flight Equipment Cost Pool. [Ref. 86] Figure 4.6 shows the Index for Value of Annual
Demand. [Ref. 87] Also included in the VAD Chart are the NAVSUP Navy Working
Capital Fund surcharges for the years included. Both the VAD and Surcharge in their
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original form are expressed as a percentage of overhead for $100 of direct cost.
Therefore before converting the VAD to an index, it was converted to a total cost figure
per $ 1 00 dollars of direct cost.
Year O&M Inf Rate % Index Index/100
1992 2.6 89.32 0.89
1993 2.4 91.47 0.91
1994 2.0 93.30 0.93
1995 1.9 95.07 0.95
1996 1.9 96.88 0.97
1997 1.7 98.52 0.99
1998 1.5 100.00 1.00
1999 1.6 101.60 1.02
2000 1.6 103.23 1.03
2001 1.8 105.08 1.05
2002 1.8 106.98 1.07
2003 1.9 109.01 1.09
2004 2.2 111.41 1.11
2005 2.2 113.86 1.14



















1995 56.6 28.3 100.00 28.3 128.30 94.00 0.94
1996 23.8 -21.6 100.00 6.70 106.70 78.00 0.78
1997 27.6 5.7 100.00 12.40 112.40 82.00 0.82
1998 55.7 24.7 100.00 37.10 137.10 100.00 1.00
1999 47.8 -3.6 100.00 33.50 133.50 97.00 0.97
Figure 4.6. VAD Price Adjustment Index (Base Year 1998)
A sample regression analysis using all three of the adjustment options was
conducted on sample raw data. The third adjustment choice produced the best data
improvement on sample regression formulas, therefore it was selected for use in
normalizing all data. Raw data are adjusted in Microsoft EXCEL by divided each raw
data cost figure by the (Index/100) figure for the appropriate year. This produces cost
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data in FY 98 constant dollars. A comprehensive adjustment matrix is presented in
Figure 4.7.




1995 0.75 0.95 0.94
1996 0.79 0.97 0.78
1997 0.84 0.99 0.82
1998 1.00 1.00 1.00
1999 0.91 1.02 0.97
2000 0.93 1.03





Figure 4.7. Data Adjustment Matrix
This concludes the methodology and data presentation chapter. The chapter
provided basic parametric analysis techniques, including regression analysis and time-
series analysis. The quantitative and qualitative research methodology of the thesis was
then presented. This highlighted the use of the hypothesis and null hypothesis for
regression analysis. Cost and Flight Hour data were analyzed at the aggregate level from
AIRLANT cost reports, and by T/M/S from 2nd MAW. Finally, the methods to create





This chapter presents the quantitative analysis of MARFORLANT cost data
outlined in Chapter IV, followed by a qualitative analysis using Simons' levers of control
as a framework for discussion. Together, these discussions allow the remaining
secondary research questions to be discussed and provide supporting evidence to answer
the primary research question of the thesis in Chapter VI.
B. REGRESSION RESULTS
The tables presented in this chapter and Appendix C display the regression results
for the analysis of cost versus flight hour relationships in several different categories.
Because the research methodology called for 95 percent confidence as the standard of
statistical significance, only those results with a p-value equal to or less than .05 for both
the b coefficient and F statistic were considered to be statistically significant. Several
regression equations showed statistical significance in these areas, but lacked a strong
coefficient of determination. In other words, these results correctly explained part of the
relationship, but should not be used for forecasting because of the amount of variation
that was unexplained by the variables. In addition, even if the slope of a regression line
was statistically significant, the coefficient (y-intercept) must be statistically significant to
be included in the equation as a fixed cost.
A sample results table is displayed in Figure 5.1:
AIRLANT Regression Results (FY 95-
98) .
(Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y a T P b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -33032 -0.76 0.52 0.6975 7.46 0.02 96.5% 94.8% 55.72 0.01 5843
AFM v. Hours 394498 1.36 0.31 -0.1202 -0.19 0.86 1.8% 0.5% 0.03 0.86 39474
DLR v. Hours 830318 2.19 0.16 -0.2237 -0.27 0.81 3.6% 0.4% 0.07 0.81 51677
Totl v. Hours 1191783 3.61 0.07 0.35 0.49 0.67 10.6% 0.3% 0.24 0.67 44967
Figure 5.1. Sample Regression Results Table
The X v. Y column shows the independent variable and the dependent variable used in
each respective analysis. The a column represents the coefficient for the y-intercept of
the regression line. This figure represents the intersection in 1000s of dollars. The b
column represents the coefficient for the slope of the regression line. Both a and b are
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followed by their respective T- ratio (t) and p-value (p) which help explain whether the
coefficients are statistically significant. The R2 and Adjusted R2 are displayed to show
the percentage of the functional relationship explained by the regression formula. The F
statistic shows the overall statistical significance of the entire equation, and is useful
particularly if the R2 and Adjusted R2 are low, but still have p values for their
coefficients that are less than or equal to .05 (a). The p-value following the F statistic
gives this assessment in probabilistic terms as well. Finally, the Standard Error of the
Estimate is represented by S, showing the potential variability ofY if used in a forecast.
1. Regression Results and the Null Hypotheses
Whether the regression analysis was conducted on the aggregate annual data from
AIRLANT or monthly data from 2nd MAW, the only relationship that consistently
showed enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis was Flight Hours versus Fuel
Costs. In some cases Total Cost was statistical significant. However, the compilation of
the three major cost pools (Fuel, AFM, and AVDLR) into this one cost category usually
diluted the strength of the Flight Hour v. Fuel relationship, causing it to lack the
statistically significance required to show a direct relationship with Flight Hours. This
tends to confirm many of the research conclusions presented from previous theses in
Chapter II; that fuel frequently varies directly with flight hours, but AFM and AVDLR
costs show a much weaker or no correlation with Flight Hours.
2. Regression Results and Aggregate Annual Data by FHP Category
AIRLANT and MARFORLANT TACAIR showed strong relationships between
Fuel Cost and Flight Hours, however only MARFORLANT showed statistical
significance in any other set of variables. (TACAIR Flight Hours v. Total Cost).
Surprisingly, none of the cost relationships for MARFORLANT Fleet Air Training
showed any statistical significance. In all cases, the maintenance categories (AFM and
DLR) never came close to showing a strong correlation to flight hours. The results are




(Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y a T P b T P R2 Adj R2 F P Se
Figure 5.2. Regression Results by Organizational/Functional Category
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Fuel v. Hours -33032 -0.76 0.52 0.6975 7.46 0.02 96.5% 94.8% 55.72 0.01 5843
AFM v. Hours 394498 1.36 0.31 -0.1202 -0.19 0.86 1 .8% 0.5% 0.03 0.86 39474
DLR v. Hours 830318 2.19 0.16 -0.2237 -0.27 0.81 3.6% 0.4% 0.07 0.81 51677
Totl v. Hours 1191783 3.61 0.07 0.35 0.49 0.67 10.6% 0.3% 0.24 0.67 44967
Marine TACAIR Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)





-17319 -1.63 0.24 0.8083 7.54 0.02 96.6% 94.9% 56.83 0.02 3393
91502 1.82 0.21 0.03 0.06 0.96 0.0% 0.5% 0.96 15998
121055 2.19 0.16 0.4645 0.83 0.49 25.6% 0.1% 0.69 0.49 17665
121055 2.19 0.16 2.4645 4.4 0.05 90.6% 85.9% 19.38 0.047 17665
Marine Fleet Air Training Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of
$)
Xv. Y a T P b T P R2 Adj R2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -11464 -0.51 0.66 1.1566 0.86 0.48 27.3% 0.1% 0.75 0.48 1319
AFM v. Hours -9343 -0.18 0.87 1.314 0.43 0.71 8.4% 0.4% 0.18 0.71 3031
DLR v. Hours 39097 0.5 0.66 -0.9563 0.2 0.86 2.0% 0.5% 0.04 0.86 4636
Totl v. Hours 18269 0.16 0.88 1.5144 0.23 0.84 2.6% 0.5% 0.05 0.84 6485
Figure 5.2 (Continued)
3. Regression Results by Aircraft Type
The regression analysis results by selected aircraft type in 2nd MAW's inventory
showed similar tendencies, where only fuel showed statistical significance regardless of
the type of aircraft. However, regression results using monthly data points from the 2nd
MAW DOLARS database failed to produce results with strong coefficients of determina-
tion. Even more surprisingly, the correlation of fuel cost to flight hours was never greater
than 46.2 %. Also, the CH-46E showed some statistically significant correlation with
four out of five of its data sets. (Hours v. Fuel, Hours v. AFM, Hours v. DLR, Hours v.
Total Cost).
Lag regression results were only included in the tables if they showed statistical
significance. This technique revealed few results that indicated a time lag was the cause
of low coefficients of determination. Figure 5.3 displays regression results by type.
Marine AV-8B Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y a T P B T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -1099 -1.85 0.21 0.7229 16.17 0.00 99.2% 98.8% 261 0.004 289.2504
AFM v. Hours 18406 15.88 0.00 -0.3242 -3.71 0.07 87.3% 80.9% 13.78 0.065 564.8663
DLR v. Hours 33148 20.41 0.00 -0.1136 -0.92 0.45 30.1% 0.0% 0.861 0.451 791.6548
Totl v. Hours 50455 16.83 0.00 0.2851 1.26 0.33 44.3% 16.5% 1.59 0.334 1461.143
AV-8B Regre ssion Results (FY 95-98 -Monthl/
Data)
Xv. Y A T P b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours
Fuel(-1) v. Hrs
Fit E. v. Hours
191590 1.16 0.25 547.87 4.02 0.00 26.0% 24.4% 16.17 327034
131778 0.81 0.42 604.5 4.47 0.00 30.8% 29.3% 20.02 319747
4705 0.83 0.41 9.199 1.97 0.06 7.8% 5.7% 3.87 0.06 11230
Figure 5.3. Regression Results by Type
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AFMv. Hours 1122969 7.77 0.00
AFM(-3) v. Hrs 1560903 10.63 0.00
DLR v. Hours 2831993 4.56 0.00
DLR(-6)v. Hrs 3899819 6.10 0.00
Totlv. Hours 415257 6.06 0.00
-20.9 -0.02 0.86 0.1% 0.0% 0.03 0.86 286139
278.3 -2.27 0.03 10.7% 8.7% 5.17 0.03 288354
27.1 0.05 0.96 0.0% 0.0% 0.96 1229115
853.7 -1.56 0.13 5.8% 3.4% 2.45 0.13 1226734
563.2 1.00 0.32 2.1% 0.0% 0.99 0.32 1356914
Marine CH-46E Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)









CH-46E Regression Results (FY
Data)
0.2241 6.35 0.02 95.2%
-0.016 -0.04 0.67 32.8%
1.0537 2.57 0.12 76.8%














Xv. Y A T P b T P R2 Adj R2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours 30278 1.89 0.06 174.1 8.98 0.00 46.2% 45.6% 80.62 0.00 57381
FltE.v. Hours 15963 3.03 0.00 13.243 2.08 0.04 4.4% 3.4% 4.32 0.04 18862
AFMv. Hours 306356 4.58 0.00 530.98 6.56 0.00 31.4% 30.7% 43.04 0.00 239501
DLRv. Hours 409411 2.58 0.01 919.6 4.79 0.00 19.6% 18.8% 22.95 0.00 567993
Totlv. Hours 762009 4.22 0.00 1637.9 7.49 0.00 37.4% 36.7% 56.06 0.00 647351
Marine F-18(AII models) Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y A T P b T P R2 Adj R2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -1038.61 -1.15 0.28 1.11 14.05 0.00 95.1% 94.6% 197.0 0.00 647.810
AFM v. Hours 5296.86 0.79 0.45 0.4192 0.71 0.49 4.8% 0.0% 0.5 0.49 4820.494
DLR v. Hours 14329.7 1.21 0.26 0.3627 0.35 0.73 1.1% 0.0% 0.12 0.73 8537.386
Totl v. Hours 18588.0 1.06 0.31 1.8919 1.24 0.24 13.3% 4.6% 1.53 0.24 12507.410
F-18(AII models) Regression Results (FY 95-98- Monthly Data)
Xv. Y A T p b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours 606623 7.72 0.00 524.72 5.51 0.00 17.6% 17.0% 30.38 0.00 389873
Fit E. v. Hours 7015 1.24 0.21 2.648 0.39 0.70 0.1% 0.0% 0.15 0.70 27983
AFM v. Hours 567260 6.08 6.80 37.1 0.37 0.71 0.1% 0.0% 0.13 0.71 413934
DLR v. Hours 1402135 5.04 0.00 -232.8 -0.69 0.49 0.3% 0.0% 0.48 0.49 1379534
Totl v. Hours 2583034 7.14 0.00 331.4 0.76 0.45 0.4% 0.0% 0.57 0.45 1796071
Figure 5.3 (Continued)
4. Interpretation of the Results by Cost Pool
While the regression analyses for each data set presented cannot prove
conclusively that fuel costs vary directly according to the number of flight hours, and also
cannot conclusively prove that maintenance costs are solely fixed, the measures of
statistical significance and goodness of fit do provide evidence to support these
hypotheses. Several key implications and possibilities should be considered for each cost
pool when interpreting these results.
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a. Flight Hours vs. Fuel Costs
The statistical evidence of this relationship seems strongest to support an
already widely accepted conclusion that fuel costs do vary closely with the number of
hours flown. This is not surprising. However, what is surprising is the low correlation of
Hours v. Fuel Costs in the monthly DOLARS regression data. These results do not fit
well with the high correlation found in Arkley's research. This may be a result of one or
a combination of three possibilities. First, in 2nd MAW fuel costs may be reported as fuel
stocks are purchased based on the need of the supporting agency and not in relation to
when fuel is actually consumed by aircraft. There is some evidence of this. For example,
in the analysis of the AV-8B, the regression revealed a higher R2 when using a one-month
time lag for the AV-8B. Second, there may be other factors unaccounted for that are
difficult to quantify using monthly data. These factors may include the types of missions
an aircraft is flying during a particular month, the environment in which the aircraft is
operating and its effect on fuel consumption, and the aircraft payload during different
mission types and its effect on fuel. Third, the adjustment index used is for an average of
all types of aviation fuel used. Therefore, the effect of the index on monthly data of a
specific aircraft type may cause inaccuracies that could be corrected by developing a
more precise fuel escalation index for each particular type of aircraft.
b. Flight Hours vs. Flight Equipment Costs
This cost pool was only analyzed because it is included in 2nd MAW
monthly obligation and cost per hour reports. Flight Equipment Costs include
administrative costs of the FHP and equipment costs for the personal equipment of both
the pilots and crew of aircraft. Therefore, the results showing no correlation of this cost
category with Flight Hours seems logical. Admittedly, extended use of flight equipment
during operations eventually may lead to replacement, but it may take years for this to
occur and is not well represented in the databases. Also, the total O&M dollars spent on
this cost category in comparison to Fuel, AFM and AVDLR are virtually immaterial with
respect to their effect on the annual formulation ofMARFORLANT FHP budgets.
c. Flight Hours vs. AFM andA VDLR Costs
Regression results for these variables ranged from statistically significant
relationships with a weak correlation to relationships with no statistical evidence of a
correlation or variability whatsoever. Like Fuel and Flight Hours, this does not
conclusively prove that there is no relationship, but seems to confirm anecdotal evidence
that much of the cost of maintenance of an aircraft is fixed. Again, several factors may
explain these results. First, these cost pools may not have been correctly adjusted
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because the VAD index used to adjust data does not adequately explain the complexities
of cost changes in the cost pools. For example, in his adjustment of Depot Level
Maintenance Costs, Arkley was able to model the change in Mean Time Between
Failures for the F-404 engine. However, no such dramatic fluctuations could be
developed for the particular types of aircraft analyzed in this thesis. Secondly, some of
the aviation maintenance costs may be related to flight hours, such as the service life of
individual components on an aircraft. However, others may not have any relationship,
such as the change in the price of parts from year to year related to the acquisition
process, or the regular interval that maintenance support personnel must conduct
preventive maintenance checks on aircraft regardless of hours flown, (termed Phase
Inspections)
To find supporting evidence to explain why there was no correlation
between flight hours and maintenance costs, further interviews were conducted with
personnel at 2nd MAW. Several logical arguments were presented by 2nd MAW personnel
that supported the absence of correlation with flight hours. First, although the AFM and
AVDLR cost pools are officially presented in FHP documents as distinct cost pools
representing different maintenance functions, there is a mixing of similar costs and
functions between the two cost pools. This would impede the development of any
effective cost adjustment index, regardless of a more detailed research effort to develop
one. Chapter II stated that the official purpose of the AFM cost pool was to record the
costs of consumable material used for the repair of aircraft, aircraft components and
aircraft ground support equipment. These types of consumables might include frequently
used parts from pre-expended bins, stock list and expendable supplies such as tools, rags
and special clothing. Other items included in the cost pool are frequently used parts such
as rivets, resistors, and O-rings, and other commonly used maintenance material such as
lubricants, and chemicals for corrosion control. In contrast, the official purpose of
Aviation Depot Level Repairables is to capture the cost of replacing repairable
components that are either unauthorized to be repaired by an intermediate maintenance
activity (IMA) or cannot be repaired because the IMA echelon does not have the
capability to accomplish the repair. However, it can also include the repair of operations
support equipment which clearly is not related to flight hours. [Ref. 88] Reality at 2nd
MAW and its supporting base organizations is that both the intermediate maintenance
organizations within the wing support structure of 2nd MAW have the technical capability
to perform depot level maintenance, and often do so. Therefore, this would tend to
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pollute the AFM cost pool with costs that technically are supposed to be Depot Level
costs. [Ref. 89]
Another plausible explanation for the finding that maintenance costs do
not correlate as well as the results from Arkley's research is that the cost pools are less
distinct than reserve cost pools. Instead of being broken down into pools that stem from
each organization of maintenance, the AFM and AVDLR cost pools are maintained in the
OFC-50 OPTARS maintained by the Marine Air Logistics Squadrons (MALS) belonging
to each air group. At 2nd MAW all Organizational Maintenance funds are controlled by
the MALS and collected within the MNT cost pool. Therefore, there is no way to
separate these costs from Intermediate Maintenance Activity costs in the way that Arkley
did. [Ref. 90]
In addition, both cost pools must bear the cost of several different
maintenance activities that are clearly a fixed cost unrelated to time. For example, depot
level agencies funded through FHP dollars often have annual pre-assigned goals of the
number of Complete Engine Repairs (CERs) they must perform annually. However,
which agency that actually performs the maintenance to meet an annual maintenance goal
is not strictly defined. It may be conducted by an intermediate level agency, a depot level
agency, or by a civilian contractor. In addition, for certain types of agencies the engines
repaired may not be on 2nd MAW engines, since many of the depot level repair within
AIRLANT is based on reciprocative agreements. Other fixed costs include the repair of
ground support equipment, fixed price contracts for corrosion control costs and technical
representatives, and the cost of unanticipated no notice technical directives that require
the comprehensive replacement or repair of particular parts. For example, in FY97 a
technical directive in response to a fatal crash of a CH-53E helicopter mandated that the
bearings associated with the helicopter swashplate be checked. A swashplate is a
mechanism beneath the rotors of the helicopter which transfers power to change the pitch
of rotor blades. The action of checking the bearings caused most of the swashplates to be
replaced at considerable cost. The FY98 cost of a swashplate assembly was over $69,000
per unit. [Ref. 91]
5. Implications for the Aviation Budget Officer and the FHP
The regression results produced from this thesis research combined with the key
findings of other FHP research outlined in Chapter II, provide evidence that the Cost Per
Hour method of allocating funds in the Flying Hour Program is only defensible for fuel
costs. In terms of OFC-50 costs for Aviation Fleet Maintenance and Aviation Depot
Level Repairables, using Cost Per Hour as a measure to justify the need for additional
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maintenance funds appears to be misleading and inaccurate. This is because fixed costs
that are expressed in a cost per unit format are subject to change if the level of activity is
different than the projected estimate. For example, Cost Per Hour for Aviation Depot
Level Repairables would be higher than predicted if the number of hours flown was less
than the number of hours budgeted.
The evidence provided in this and other research does not change the fact that
Cost Per Hour is still the accepted measure for funding in the Flying Hour Program.
Therefore, the Aviation Budget Officer must rely on detailed historical data and the
experience of 2nd MAW maintenance and budgeting personnel to help him justify
MARFORLANT maintenance needs in a way that both gains approval of the budgeting
administrative chain of command and accurately states the needs ofMARFORLANT.
C. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES OF FHP DATA
This section presents alternative analyses based on historical trends of cost, force
structure, and flight hour execution. It also briefly compares the cost of TACAIR at
MARFORLANT with MARFORPAC. First, a comparison of the annual cost of
MARFORLANT TACAIR reflects the recent increasing maintenance costs discussed in
Chapters II and III. Whether this trend is analyzed in nominal dollars, constant 1998
dollars, or as a percentage of total cost, the analysis shows that AVDLR costs are an
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Figure 5.4 (Continued)
In addition, these increases in maintenance costs have occurred while the total
number of aircraft authorized and the total number of hours executed through the MACP
have significantly decreased. Figure 5.5 displays two tables illustrating these trends.
MARFORLANT TACAIR Budgeted v.
Flight Hours
Executed
FY Actual Programmed % Executed
1995 120021 117501 102.1%
1996 104488 108671 96.2%
1997 80983 83923 96.5%
1998 84572 86791 97.4%
Figure 5.5. MARFORLANT Historical Trends for Aircraft Authorized
and Flight Hours
77
MARFORLANT TACAIR Aircraft Authorized
ALL AV-8B CH-46E CH-53E F-18A F-18C F-18D
1996 363 63 73 35 36 22 35
1997 332 62 69 31 28 24 35
1998 306 53 61 29 25 21 33
Figure 5.5 (Continued)
In addition, Figure 5.5 also shows that the switch to sortie based flight planning has not
adversely affected the ability of MARFORLANT to execute its programmed number of
flight hours.
A comparison of MARFORLANT trends to MARFORPAC did not reveal any
significant differences in cost and flight hour execution trends. In particular, a
comparison of the percentage of total cost for the three primary FHP cost pools showed
no significant differences. In addition, regression analysis was conducted on
MARFORPAC TACAIR data from 1995-1998. The results showed no significant
difference compared to MARFORLANT. Figure 5.6 shows the comparison of
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Marine Forces Pacific TACAIR Regression Results from AIRPAC Cost Reports
MFPAC TACAIR Regr Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y A T P B T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -24582 -2.63 0.12 0.64135 10.2 0.01 98.1% 97.1% 104.5 0.009 1761.7
AFM v. Hours 136902 9.84 0.01 -0.01215 -1.28 0.33 45.0% 17.5% 1.63 0.328 2664.3
DLR v. Hours 244084 8.67 0.01 -0.17248 -0.89 0.46 28.7% 0.0% 0.8 0.463 5392.5
Totl v. Hours 356405 21.75 0.00 0.3474 3.1 0.09 82.8% 74.2% 9.66 0.089 3138.8
Figure 5.7. MARFORPAC TACAIR Regression Results
D. OPTIONS FOR FORECASTING FUTURE COSTS
The results of quantitative analysis of the Flying Hour Program at
MARFORLANT are helpful in explaining cost behavior. Since statistical analysis
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suggests that fuel costs exhibit variable cost behavior while maintenance costs exhibit
fixed cost behavior, the MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer should be wary of
budget adjustments in the OP-20 model that treat AFM and AVDLR as variable costs.
These conclusions may be used to dispute the underfunding of MARFORLANT
maintenance and AVDLR OPTARs during annual and mid-year budget negotiations with
higher commands. However, the fact that the Aviation Budget Officer understands flaws
in the OP-20 budgeting model does not make it any easier to predict precisely what
MARFORLANT will need in future budgets. Fuel costs may be relatively predictable,
but as the quantitative analysis shows, fuel cost is never more than 25% of the total cost
of the FHP. If the rest of the FHP cost is relatively fixed, what is the best way to predict
this cost?
Unless a better regression model can be developed both for the aggregate annual
cost of the Flying Hour Program and also for the cost of flying individual types of aircraft
at the wing level or below, regression analysis as a forecasting tool is unlikely to be any
more effective than the current method. The reason for this is not that regression cannot
estimate a forecasted cost, or cannot be used as a budgeting tool, but simply that the
statistical variability of the fixed costs in the model are too great, and reduce confidence
in the accuracy of the model. The results of Hours v. Total Cost from MARFORLANT
TACAIR annual cost data in Figure 5.8 may be used as an example.
Marine TACAIR Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y I a | T I P I b I T [P I R2 I Adj R2 I F I P I Se
Totlv. Hours 121055 2.19 0.16 2.4645 4.4 0.05 90.6% 85.9% 19.38 0.047 17665
Regression Formula for Total Cost (in $1000s) = 2.4645(HOURS)
Figure 5.8. MARFORLANT TACAIR: Hours vs. Total Cost
First, despite the statistical significance of the overall model, the fixed costs
represented by the coefficient, a, are not statistically significant. This reflects the reality
that the fixed costs in the model are not predictable from year to year. From another
perspective, the Standard Error of the Estimate (Se) is $17,665 million dollars.
Therefore, using this model, the Aviation Budget Officer would have a confident level of
0.9 that the actual annual cost of his forecast would be within ± 2 standard deviations of
the prediction. In other words, ±(2x 17.665 million) = ± 35.33 million dollars. This
type of variability may help explain bowwaves, but it does little to help the Aviation
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Budget Officer to have confidence in an alternative forecast. Thus, some of the
limitations of regression as a forecasting tool are exposed.
Another possible method might be to forecast using a statistical add-in program
such as "Crystal Ball". This method would attempt to model the variability of
MARFORLANT FHP cost pools using a simulation of fixed costs. Marines with a
detailed knowledge of fixed costs within the AFM and AVDLR cost pools could assign
probabilities for the likelihood of an expected cost range for each variable. The fixed cost
variables would then be compiled in a spreadsheet, that showed the total estimated cost of
AFM and AVDLR. The add-in program then would run a Monte Carlo simulation so that
a significant number of trials helped to determine the likelihood of AFM and AVDLR
fixed costs. Although the assignment of probabilities to cost estimates is as subjective as
the cost estimates themselves, this method has the advantage of being able to draw upon
the experience of those more familiar with the cost behavior of components of fixed
maintenance costs. However, like regression analysis, the use of a Monte Carlo
simulation cannot eliminate unforeseeable changes in fixed costs. In addition, the time
consuming nature of developing this cost estimate could prohibit its use.
Ultimately, fixed costs must be predicted and supported in the same manner as
they have been since the inception of PPBS. The key personnel with a knowledge of the
expected cost of maintenance make their best estimate based on experience. Then the
annual budget negotiations to justify budget submissions are held. In the end, the budget
politics outlined in Chapter II dominate the final determination of the number of hours
and the cost of the Flying Hour Program.
E. ANALYSIS OF FHP AS A MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
Despite the understanding of Flying Hour Program cost behavior gained from
quantitative analysis, the Aviation Budget Officer still faces the task of securing
sufficient funding for MARFORLANT Aviation in the face of a complex budgeting
environment. Simons' Levers of Control provides a framework that helps to understand
the tensions inherent in the implementation of the Flying Hour Program and the MACP
as budgeting strategies. This section provides an analysis of the MACP and the FHP
within this context, and the implications of this analysis for the Aviation Budget Officer.
The final section of Chapter II summarized the four levers of control, that cause
opposing tension during the implementation of any management strategy. These four
levers are beliefs systems, boundary systems, interactive control systems, and diagnostic
control systems. In review, Simons describes belief systems and interactive control
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systems as the positive forces of management control, while boundary systems and
diagnostic control systems are the negative forces of control. When Marine Aviation at
MARFORLANT is placed in the context of this framework, the four levers of control are
represented by many of the systems and strategies analyzed in this thesis. These are
listed in bullets below.
• Marine Aviation Belief Systems= Marine Aviation Core Values
^ Central Core Value to Marine Aviation Operational Readiness
*=> Central Core Value to MACP. . .Long Term Readiness
=> Fiscal Integrity
• Boundary Systems = Aviation Risks to Be Avoided
=> Aviation Safety Standards
<=> Aviation Maintenance Standards
=> Standards of Quality of Life for Marines
<=> Legal and Procedural Budgeting Standards
"=> Formal and Informal Systems of Discipline
• Diagnostic Control Systems = Aviation Critical Performance
Variables
=> Measurement Systems of Operational and Maintenance Readiness
=> Budgeting Systems: PPBS, FHP
• Interactive Control Systems = Strategic and Management Planning
"=> Master Plans for Aviation
=> Mark and Reclama Process
11 Informal Networks and Negotiated Solutions
The systems, standards and ideas are the relevant "Levers of Control" that the
MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer faces in trying to execute his primary duty: to
maintain the fiscal integrity of MARFORLANT Aviation. Maintaining fiscal integrity
through the Flying Hour Program has a direct impact on the core value of aviation
readiness. However, the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan presents an additional
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approach: that future readiness should not be sacrificed at the expense of maintaining
current readiness.
Even though the common goal inherent to the MACP is to maintain both current
and future operational readiness, the mere statement of this goal does not guarantee its
achievement. Pilots, commanding officers, maintenance officers, budget officers, and the
rest of the personnel involved in achieving this vision are restricted in their efforts by the
rules and norms of FHP and PPBS. They face considerable formal and informal
boundaries that attempt to ensure certain standards are not sacrificed to achieve
operational ends. Aviation Safety standards seem to be the most obvious and critical of
all the standards that protect Marine Aviation from unacceptable risk. However, just as
critical are the capabilities of Marines to do their jobs. In this way, the Marine Aviation
Campaign Plan set several standards that needed to be met to ensure the comprehensive
health of Marine Aviation.
These standards are monitored by several traditional systems described in this
thesis. The monitoring systems, called diagnostic control systems, provide feedback as to
whether the beliefs and visions for Marine Aviation are being met, and whether
boundaries are being violated in the process. The many formal and informal rules of the
FHP, PPBS, and the budget allocation and execution systems provide this feedback on
fiscal matters. However, as the 2nd MAW cost data demonstrated, sometimes the validity
and usefulness of the data is limited. Likewise, readiness reports and the assessments of
commanders and staff in the chain of command provide limited measures of operational
and logistical readiness.
The Department of the Navy and DOD have well developed, traditional
management control systems for these first three levers. However, the fourth lever of
control, Interactive Control Systems, seems to be the least well developed of the process.
The interactive control system is supposed to stimulate the search for new strategies to
achieve goals in the face of uncertainty. At the highest levels of DON, this is what the
PPBS and FHP systems are supposed to accomplish. However, because of the sheer size
of the Department of the Navy, and because of the entrenched positions and fiscal
strategies of the other service departments and Congress, these systems oftentimes do not
produce the most efficient or fiscally responsible action. Instead, these systems
oftentimes produce disincentives to act in the best interests of their organization and run
against their belief systems. A frequently used but unattributed anecdote about
misincentives within the Flying Hour Program is how squadrons flew additional hours or
dumped fuel in the middle of flights to achieve their cost and flight hour targets. The
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justification for these actions is that unless they fully spend their funds by the end of the
fiscal year, would lose funding in next year's budget.
The volume of boundaries and internal controls limiting the action of command-
ing officers, comptrollers, and other decision makers has constrained their ability to make
significant improvements in aviation readiness. Yet the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan
is unique because it has reduced the effect of several inherent, unwritten rules of the FHP
an PPBS in favor of the appropriate ends. Most significantly, the aspect of the Plan that
cuts flight hours in an unprecedented number and then expects the cost savings from
these hours to pay for simulator acquisition breaks several unwritten rules about
budgeting. Perhaps the most significant disincentive built into the rules of the budget
process is that when an agency states it can accomplish its mission with fewer resources,
the resources saved are often withdrawn in punishment vice reward for savings behavior.
In addition, the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan causes FHP and other DON
budgeting methods to be examined and debated as to whether MACP goals are being
accomplished or thwarted. Chapter II explained the four characteristics of interactive
control systems. First, the system must generate information analyzed on a recurring
basis to be addressed by the higher level managers. Second, the interactive control
system demands regular attention from operating managers at all levels. Third, the data
must be interpreted and discussed in face to face meetings of superiors, subordinates and
peers. Fourth, the system is a catalyst for the continual challenge of underlying data,
assumptions and action plans. [Ref. 92] In itself, the FHP does not embody these
characteristics. However, as part of the MACP, the FHP has been given new life in
several ways. First, by demanding sortie based planning for operations from flight hour
based planning, the MACP has made it simpler for commanders to focus on their mission
of operational readiness. Second, the achievement of all the goals of the MACP must be
accomplished by Marines at all levels, and thus the MACP is a catalyst for new ideas and
a means for stimulating debate over whether the goals of MACP are being achieved.
Finally, from a budgeting perspective, the MACP provides incentive to all levels of
Marine Aviation to use the correct means to achieve the specified goals of the program,
i.e., to maintain long term readiness without sacrificing current readiness.
The implications for the Aviation Budget Officer at MARFORLANT are similar
to the conclusions drawn from regression forecasting. Publishing the plan does not
ensure its executability, and requires vigilant monitoring and cooperation by key players
managing the FHP. MACP requires the Aviation Budget Officer to be continuously
engaged in monitoring the costs of Marine Aviation, determining and debating the fiscal
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needs for Marine Aviation in the future. This can only be done by actively scrutinizing
and debating the inputs, outputs, and consequences of the FHP with seniors and
subordinates, accomplished with analysts, Marines and Sailors up and down the
budgeting chain of command.
A recent example of this process at work occurred at a team budget meeting at
NAVCOMPT to address concerns that the combination of a maintenance "bowwave" and
underfunding of the FHP in budget outyears would jeopardize the MACP. At the root of
the problem is increasing maintenance costs and the desire of FMB analysts to fall back
on the use of budgeting habits to cut Marine Aviation funding because flight hours
(PMR) were not being executed. The intervention of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations
and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps provided visibility to the problem,
and budgeting shortfalls were corrected after a meeting of many of the key players in the
budgeting chain of command ranging from representatives of 2nd MAW to NAVCOMPT.
F. SUMMARY
In summary, this chapter presented regression analysis and results for Hours vs.
Cost Pool relationships. In addition, alternative use of quantitative methods to explain
the current state of the FHP at MARFORLANT was analyzed. This was followed by an
analysis of the qualitative dynamics of Marine Aviation at MARFORLANT as part of
management control systems framework. The central theme of the chapter is that despite
the seeming strength of statistical methods, the Aviation Budget Officer must ultimately
rely on the experience of aviation operations and maintenance experts, and on a network
of contacts to ensure that the FHP is fully funded.
85
86
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Within the context of the challenges that confront the aviation community, this
thesis examined and analyzed three major components of the Flying Hour Program at
U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic. Understanding these components is essential to answering
the primary research question, "How should the Flying Hour Program be managed at
MARFORLANT to maximize its value to Marine Aviation."
The first component of this thesis analyzes the federal and Department of Defense
budget process, and its consequences for budgeting for MARFORLANT. Chapters II and
III analyzed critical parts of this process including the impact of congressional
budgeting, the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, and the dynamics
resulting from complexity in the operational and administrative chains of command.
The second component analyzed the historical background and the organization of
the Flying Hour Program. The basic OP-20 model was analyzed relative to its
relationship with TACAIR, Fleet Air Training and Fleet Air Support program elements of
the FHP. Current problems with the Flying Hour Program and its impact on
MARFORANT Aviation was assessed.
The third component analyzed the Flying Hour Program utilizing both
quantitative and qualitative analysis. Cost behavior from monthly and annual FHP cost
data bases was analyzed using regression and time-series analysis to determine whether
MARFORLANT cost behavior is were similar to that found in previous research on the
FHP. The Flying Hour Program and related budgeting systems were analyzed within the
context of the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan.
A. SUMMARY OF SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Seven secondary research questions were answered in the thesis to provide
context and to answer the primary research question.
1. What are the historical trends of flying hour program budgeting and
execution?
Chapter III and Chapter V present data on the historical trends of FHP budgeting
and execution at MARFORLANT. The majority of FHP funds at MARFORLANT fund
tactical aviation (TACAIR). Therefore, TACAIR was the focus of analysis. Time series
analysis showed that Fuel and Aircraft Fleet Maintenance have been relatively stable in
constant dollars over the past seven years. However, Aviation Depot Level Repairables
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have been continually increasing in cost due to a complex combination of aviation
logistics and budgeting problems. Some of these problems are described in Chapters II
and III. Research demonstrated that the primary budgeting agency for MARFORLANT
TACAIR, the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, has generally executed its programmed flight
hours within four percent of its goals. Implementation of the Marine Aviation Campaign
Plan has significantly reduced the total number of hours flown annually since 1996.
2. How has the switch from flying hour based budgeting to event based
budgeting affected Marine Aviation at MARFORLANT?
Initial research showed that this question did not accurately describe what was
occurring as a consequence of the institution of the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan.
Interviews with the MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer and 2nd MAW Comptroller
revealed that programmed hours have been slightly underexecuted due to the conversion
of the MACP. "In FY 97, the first real year of the (Marine) Aviation Campaign Plan, 2nd
MAW flew 65,447 sorties/98,208 hours." [Ref. 93] The sortie based goal for FY 98 was
71, 948 sorties/105,438 hours. [Ref. 94] Again, this goal was underexecuted. The
current tendency of sortie based planning seems to confirm underexecution of the
budgeted hours from N-88. However, this has not yet critically impacted
MARFORLANT because of the willingness of the budgeting chain of command to give
the MACP a chance to improve flight hour program management.
At the MARFORLANT level, the Aviation Budget Officer deals with the
budgeting chain of command strictly in terms of flight hours for both budget formulation
and execution. Therefore, other than the underexecution of hours, the impact on
MARFORLANT administration of the program is minimal. In the future, two problems
may develop with the MACP approach to planning and execution. First, the advantage of
planning by sorties may be lost if MARFORLANT Aviation Budgets are cut as a
consequence of underexecution of hours. Second, attempts to fly more hours even
though training is planned by sortie may cause behaviors that run counter to the "better
management" intent of the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan.
3. What are the budgeting dynamics that currently threaten full funding
ofMARFORLANT' s aviation programs?
Budgeting dynamics are explored throughout the thesis. They may be grouped
into three types: organizational dynamics, procedural dynamics, and impact on cost
behavior. Examples of organizational dynamics that threaten full funding range from the
annual struggle to obtain adequate dollars from Congress, to the efforts of
MARFORLANT to justify budget priorities to higher level DOD administrative agents.
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Procedural dynamics include PPBS complexity and the difficulty of predicting the future
costs of the Flight Hour Program. Cost behavior effects were explained primarily using
regression analysis.
Analysis of cost behavior illustrated three points about cost data at
MARFORLANT. First, only fuel costs showed consistent statistical significance as a
dependent variable of the number of flight hours flown. In addition, fuel costs for 2nd
MAW monthly data were statistically significant, but did not demonstrate strong
correlation to flight hours. Second, the lack of statistical significance and correlation of
maintenance costs to flight hours suggests one or a combination of three possibilities: (a)
that maintenance costs are largely fixed, (b) that finding parametric means of explaining
maintenance costs is difficult, and (c) that the cost pools as they are compiled in the
active duty FHP databases have many overhead and fixed costs that explain why
correlation is low. The MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer should be mindful that
few analysts and participants in the FHP budget process understand these cost behaviors.
Therefore, MARFORLANT should be wary to watch for analysis that cuts flying budgets
under the assumption that all costs vary directly with flight hours.
4. What is the financial condition of the MARFORLANT Aviation
program compared with MARFORPAC, and if there is a difference,
what explains the differences?
In comparing MARFORLANT with MARFORPAC, no significant differences
were found in budgeting and cost behavior. Although the command size and budget of
MARFORPAC are larger than MARFORLANT, regression analysis of MARFORPAC
annual TACAIR data showed similar cost behavior to MARFORLANT. Also, as a
percentage of total cost, the FHP cost pools of MARFORPAC versus MARFORLANT
do not differ by more than 5% per year in any cost pool. Environmental factors account
for these differences including weather, operational requirements, and training conditions.
However, these factors were not analyzed in this thesis because of the small difference
between the cost pools.
5. Can new financial models be developed to more accurately capture the
realities ofMARFORLANT aviation?
Although some previous research by Arkley suggested that regression analysis
can be used as an effective tool to forecast flying hour costs, the results from analysis in
Chapter V showed that this probably will not work for MARFORLANT. There are two
reasons supporting this conclusion. First, the costing systems used by Active duty Navy
and Marine forces do not capture maintenance costs in the same way they are captured for
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Navy and Marine Corps Reserve units. Second, the unpredictability of maintenance
costs, AVDLR in particular, has become the critical problem affecting the accuracy of
FHP forecasts. The regression results from this thesis suggest that unless better
adjustments of maintenance data are developed, regression forecasts may have too much
variability to be used as a primary means for prediction.
6. Can simulation be used to test the accuracy of current and alternative
aviation cost models at MARFORLANT?
A Monte Carlo simulation could be used as an alternative to regression
forecasting. However, the time needed to develop such a model would probably prohibit
its usefulness at MARFORLANT. In addition, until a better understanding of all
maintenance costs is developed, this simulation probably would provide give any more
assurance about future fixed costs than methods used presently.
7. What future budgeting and operating adjustments does
MARFORLANT need to make to successfully meet the goals of the
Marine Aviation Campaign Plan?
The MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer must monitor one basic problem in
keeping the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan intact. That problem is out-year
underfunding. To do this, he must ensure that Program Objectives Memorandum OP-20s
and Budget Execution OP-20s are not underfunded either in hours or cost. This is
because the Marine Corps is reliant on the projected cost savings of MACP to fund the
purchase of simulators, and because the Marine Corps wants to avoid a penalty for flying
less hours in the interests of the long range logistical health of its airframes.
B. SUMMARY OF THE PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
Despite the findings from previous research cited in Chapter II that implied a new
FHP forecasting model could be developed through regression analysis, the quantitative
analysis in this thesis showed some of the pitfalls of regression as a forecasting tool for
the FHP. Given the nature of MARFORLANT cost pools, regression analysis can be
helpful as a supplemental tool, but it cannot relieve the Aviation Budget Officer of
uncertainty in estimating the annual cost of the Flying Hour Program. Arkley
commented in his thesis that, "...incremental increasing, or decreasing budget requests
based on a 'gut feel' of the future is no longer an acceptable planning method." [Ref. 95]
However, given the flaws of the OP-20 model in improperly modeling maintenance costs,
budget execution judgement based on the observations of experienced individuals at all
levels of the Department of the Navy and MARFORLANT spectrum still plays the most
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important role in determining annual spending totals. Analysis of the FHP and PPBS
processes reveals that obtaining adequate funding for MARFORLANT Aviation is as
much a result of the dynamics of budget politics and support networks as it is the result of
proper modeling ofFHP cost.
Therefore, considering the answers to the secondary research questions and the
uncertainty of budgeting for future conditions, the following recommendations are
intended to assist the MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer in effectively managing
the FHP.
1. Since the majority of FHP funds in MARFORLANT flow to 2nd MAW
aviation programs, the MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer is much more of an
advocate and liaison for 2nd MAW to higher echelons of command than a manager of
FHP funds. This is because, unlike MARFORPAC, 2nd MAW is the only Tactical Air
Wing under MARFORLANT. Its staff and experience level are greater than the Aviation
Budget Officer staff at MARFORLANT. Therefore, the MARFORLANT Aviation
Budget must rely on the estimates and experience of 2nd MAW in recommending the best
budgeting courses of action to the MARFORLANT Comptroller and to higher budgeting
agencies.
2. The MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer must continually improve
knowledge and build budgeting networks to be in the best position to obtain adequate
funding of the FHP. This requires becoming familiar with the three major components of
the FHP presented in the beginning of Chapter VI: the overarching context of DOD
budgeting, the organization and adminstration of the FHP, and the cost behavior and
organizational behavior of the aviation budgeting process. In particular, the Aviation
Budget Officer should be wary of efforts to cut the budget based upon incorrect
assumptions about the FHP, as explained in Chapter II.
3. As the analysis of the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan illustrates, the
MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer should not always follow the most conserva-
tive (unwritten) rules of budgeting reviewed in Chapter V. However, the potential risks
of deviation from a conservative budgeting methodology must be carefully considered.
Most importantly, deviation from standard budgeting techniques requires the support not
only of the agencies that are effected directly, such as the Commanding General
MARFORLANT or Commanding General 2nd MAW, but also requires the support of the
administrators and analysts in the budgeting chain of command that NAVCOMPT.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Further research on the components of the OFC-50 cost pools may better reveal
the cost behavior of Aviation Fleet Maintenance Costs and Aviation Depot Level
Repairable Costs. The primary research question would be to determine effective ways
for forecasting the fixed and variable costs in these cost pools. This research also could
better explain the fixed and variable nature of those cost pools.
In addition, in several more years research into the comprehensive successes and
failures of the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan would provide insight into how the norms
of the federal budgeting process and budget execution control in the Marine Corps ought
to be changed.
Finally, a detailed analysis of the effect of Navy Working Capital Fund
Surcharges and changes in Value of Annual Demand (VAD) could provide a better
explanation of Aviation Fleet Maintenance and Aviation Depot Level Repairables price
changes and how this effects FHP budgeting. This was the topic least understood by all
personnel contacted in the research for the thesis.
D. CONCLUSION
The Marine Corps Flying Hour Program at MARFORLANT is characterized by
similar cost behavior and budgeting dynamics compared to that found through research
conducted elsewhere in the Department of the Navy. Regression results of
MARFORLANT cost data revealed that the OP-20 model correctly models Fuel Costs as
directly variable with flight hours. However, maintenance costs related to flight hours
were not statistically significant (with little or no correlation). A possible conclusion as a
result of this analysis is that maintenance and aviation depot level repairable costs are
fixed or mostly fixed, and thus are incorrectly modeled for budgeting in the OP-20.
While the OP-20 model has flaws for use in forecasting, no regression model was defined
in this thesis to provide an adequate enough forecast to consider replacing the OP-20.
Rather, analysts and budgeteers must be wary of the forecasts in the OP-20 and weigh
OP-20 accuracy against the use of alternative forecasting methods. Consequently, the
MARFORLANT Aviation Budget Officer still must understand the human, organiza-
tional, operational and logistical dynamics of budgeting to obtain adequate funding for
Marine Aviation. Well prepared, logical budget justifications supported by credible
statistics are still the best tools available to the Aviation Budget Officer to satisfy the
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CABEAST Total $9,103,000 $10,032,762









APPENDIX B. COMPREHENSIVE COST AND FLIGHT HOUR DATA
AIRLANT Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data (in millions of nominal $)
YEAR TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 593099 $269,531 $293,966 $455,087 $1,018,584
1993 545837 $235,904 $294,273 $502,435 $1,032,612
1994 498344 $267,356 $254,009 $529,836 $1,051,201
1995 498344 $233,529 $284,962 $678,536 $1,197,027
1996 479171 $243,083 $294,651 $551,896 $1,089,630
1997 427110 $223,692 $288,295 $561,374 $1,073,361
1998 428330 $261,368 $323,007 $785,627 $1,370,002
Marine TACAIR Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data (in millions of nominal $)
YEAR TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 125,418 $53,159 $74,162 $101,471 $228,792
1993 113,587 $46,313 $68,017 $112,599 $226,929
1994 112,137 $58,492 $62,923 $128,637 $250,052
1995 120,021 $58,840 $79,041 $161,648 $299,529
1996 104,488 $55,464 $88,222 $135,217 $278,903
1997 80,983 $41,710 $75,990 $115,972 $233,672
1998 84,572 $47,857 $87,209 $177,485 $312,551
Marine Fleet Replacement Squadron Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data
(in millions of nominal $)
YEAR TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 17102 $7,320 $8,741 $9,005 $25,066
1993 16268 $6,705 $8,850 $15,047 $30,602
1994 16762 $8,469 $7,422 $14,932 $30,823
1995 16762 $6,697 $8,196 $16,874 $31,767
1996 17307 $6,970 $11,140 $18,040 $36,150
1997 16909 $5,981 $10,653 $19,905 $36,539
1998 16010 $6,328 $14,092 $27,201 $47,620
Marine AV-8B (TACAIR only) Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data
(in millions of nominal $)
YEAR TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 21775 $10,989 $15,407 $14,644 $41,040
1993 17936 $8,725 $14,346 $26,086 $49,157
1994 16158 $8,932 $9,920 $24,140 $42,992
1995 17213 $8,356 $11,599 $28,926 $48,881
1996 14745 $7,850 $11,111 $24,877 $43,838
1997 10019 $5,081 $12,297 $25,604 $42,982
1998 9503 $5,722 $15,266 $32,638 $53,626
95
Marine CH-46E (TACAIR only) Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data
(in millions of nominal $)
YEAR TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 21724 $2,308 $11,662 $16,586 $30,556
1993 22889 $2,447 $10,676 $17,931 $31,054
1994 20781 $2,845 $9,990 $14,182 $27,017
1995 21111 $2,834 $14,604 $27,418 $44,856
1996 18086 $2,645 $13,959 $19,758 $36,362
1997 14664 $2,024 $14,441 $17,346 $33,811
1998 16054 $2,552 $15,268 $26,324 $53,626
Marine CH-53E (TACAIR only) Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data
(in millions of nominal $)
YEAR TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 6988 $2,107 $5,940 $8,864 $16,911
1993 7696 $2,347 $5,531 $10,231 $18,109
1994 7604 $2,846 $6,171 $13,508 $22,525
1995 7591 $2,574 $7,820 $19,001 $29,395
1996 6287 $2,218 $9,338 $16,367 $27,923
1997 6086 $2,138 $8,106 $11,962 $22,206
1998 6830 $2,713 $9,247 $21,274 $33,234
Marine F-18 (TACAIR only) Annual Flying Hour Program Cost Data
(in millions of nominal $)
YEAR T/M/S TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
HOURS FUEL AFM AVDLR COST
1992 F-18A 19723 $15,682 $14,778 $21,683 $52,143
1993 F-18A 19123 $14,677 $10,758 $21,797 $47,232
1994 F-18A 17366 $14,786 $8,797 $22,939 $46,522
1995 F-18A 14294 $11,036 $7,869 $18,267 $37,172
1996 F-18A 13338 $10,770 $17,291 $27,196 $55,257
1997 F-18A 8165 $6,422 $11,089 $21,064 $38,575
1998 F-18A 8897 $7,707 $12,916 $30,778 $51,401
1992 F-18C 5013 $4,327 $0,349 $0,367 $5,043
1993 F-18C 5450 $4,181 $3,118 $6,318 $13,617
1994 F-18C 6535 $6,966 $3,343 $8,717 $19,026
1995 F-18C 11398 $9,314 $6,295 $14,613 $30,222
1996 F-18C 9610 $8,482 $5,532 $9,445 $23,459
1997 F-18C 8826 $7,967 $4,017 $7,587 $19,571
1998 F-18C 8069 $7,411 $6,156 $13,961 $27,528
1993 F-18D 3187 $1,895 $1,715 $3,475 $7,085
1994 F-18D 10894 $7,826 $5,454 $14,222 $27,502
1995 F-18D 14953 $11,628 $8,319 $19,310 $39,257
1996 F-18D 13749 $11,064 $7,865 $9,140 $28,069
1997 F-18D 11275 $9,747 $9,437 $10,418 $29,602




a MAW Cost Data By Type
AV8B Flight Hour and Cost Data
(in nominal $)
MONTH YEAR TYPE UNIT TOT HRS 7B (FUEL) 7F (FLT E) 7L (AFM) 9S(DLR)
OCT 1993 AV-8B MAG-14 1502 404377 17656 983726 1208841
NOV 1993 AV-8B MAG-14 1587 1387808 20444 1065726 3993832
DEC 1993 AV-8B MAG-14 1265 940714 23271 1038230 2011457
JAN 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1339 821546 34987 1123930 1857766
FEB 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1348 764488 18908 917451 2404178
MAR 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1766 1035192 15315 977172 3014189
APR 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1324 1257645 140 1667121 1775139
MAY 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1531 1282844 4018 900314 2067036
JUNE 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1550 802270 12887 1166062 2290773
JULY 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1675 1373295 7372 1315474 3028675















NOV 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1216 923898 16474 987739 2109321
DEC 1994 AV-8B MAG-14 1372 465518 18933 1008006 2261507
JAN 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1593 868581 23474 774113 3029540
FEB 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1391 1211281 14637 914386 3713828






















JULY 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1345 999299 46697 1284104 1605842
AUG 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1010 893291 14789 909028 2257422
SEP 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1296 874066 42131 800951 1582533
OCT 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1650 741812 23514 972789 3414815
NOV 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1554 555970 6925 911972 1793780
DEC 1995 AV-8B MAG-14 1822 981330 21635 791611 1333825
JAN 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 1667 895739 15246 983082 2230832
FEB 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 2115 933669 15782 854062 2761881
MAR 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 1416 392216 6326 1196282 2442672
APR 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 1464 867922 18769 1221727 2595214
MAY 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 1423 1063056 13899 1309351 2246438
JUNE 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 1423 1489109 26439 1449470 2195582






















NOV 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 540 219499 8573 870316 1918145
DEC 1996 AV-8B MAG-14 534 410435 5564 759340 1723215
JAN 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1162 470013 10323 895926 2515425
FEB 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 898 896546 15681 1313721 3625735
MAR 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1206 312922 5486 1306360 3936498
APR 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1135 645481 5030 984683 3411195
MAY 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1056 815032 13496 985694 1815020
97
JUNE 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 843 318581 7859 951949 2185724
JULY 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1067 525445 12793 1037602 346127
AUG 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 992 429274 7833 1063585 1133512
SEP 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 715 816134 4707 822263 3391960
OCT 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 939 563038 10616 1554709 8012097
NOV 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 910 627459 12767 1228490 3328630
DEC 1997 AV-8B MAG-14 1150 570889 6454 1744568 1929010
JAN 1998 AV-8B MAG-14 700 511724 6550 1301136 3818785
FEB 1998 AV-8B MAG-14 767 503077 14874 1226841 3278228
MAR 1998 AV-8B MAG-14 911 529215 14782 1673357 1729328
APR 1998 AV-8B MAG-14 823 544532 8513 1850104 3800512
MAY 1998 AV-8B MAG-14 761 589969 6342 849272 2408693
JUNE 1998 AV-8B MAG-14 1049 576207 1906 1185793 1984557
JULY 1998 AV-8B MAG-14 828 839309 17582 771002 1670196
AUG 1998 AV-8B MAG-14 1089 712674 4516 938326 2456395
SEP 1998 AV-8B MAG-14 946 784360 33992 1007345 1484119
CH46E Flight Hour and Cost Data
(in nominal $)
MON YEAR TYPE UNIT HOURS rB(FUEL) 7F(FLTE) 7L (AFM) 9S(DLR)
NOV 1993 CH-46E MAG-26 875 151818 34261 640318 989061
NOV 1993 CH-46E MAG-29 651 115583 13773 293610 353855
DEC 1993 CH-46E MAG-26 789 159195 25462 683627 613809
DEC 1993 CH-46E MAG-29 507 95481 48125 341903 274182
JAN 1994 CH-46E MAG-26 832 203133 22926 210134 955847
JAN 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 381 123635 9558 236879 261738
FEB 1994 CH-46E MAG-26 704 215274 13420 454894 521614
FEB 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 514 101475 20746 431646 327725
MAR 1994 CH-46E MAG-26 663 208090 1555 565035 969255
MAR 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 854 119199 11270 422908 698209
APR 1994 CH-46E MAG-26 712 196575 36696 382119 600765
APR 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 959 103156 3203 411341 406906
MAY 1994 CH-46E MAG-26 523 192100 14432 628321 850762
MAY 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 890 124042 16666 510285 454138
JUNE 1994 CH-46E MAG-26 563 251660 24667 1065368 806302
JUNE 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 732 114956 17593 333951 703753
JULY 1994 CH-46E MAG-26 612 182095 28599 532435 629913
JULY 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 570 127916 5756 321089 115163













SEP 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 161329 16332 186855 492160
OCT 1994 CHM6E MAG-26 976 147782 12321 966315 1445133
OCT 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 637 97706 11401 457681 908440
NOV 1994 CH-46E MAG-26 822 126483 8531 633547 788126
NOV 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 620 104849 24168 354088 761341
DEC 1994 CH-46E MAG-26 965 118449 45187 664594 1337259
DEC 1994 CH-46E MAG-29 706 91252 23508 541093 669221
JAN 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 1083 206919 10073 737560 1 372776
98
JAN 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 811 150582 33531 446602 1240017
FEB 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 1277 230683 21126 779715 1171546
FEB 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 735 101678 9643 628167 902235
MAR 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 1129 175100 42207 655188 1111280
MAR 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 718 106590 15047 585537 1472493
APR 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 953 336446 7338 741112 1041586
APR 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 591 96595 18565 412234 624079
MAY 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 1327 177385 19421 970327 1147731
MAY 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 743 86861 22022 438736 832077
JUNE 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 1474 206409 22066 836130 1522621
JUNE 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 407 125401 5858 370716 431309
JULY 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 1402 301989 97090 619203 970194
JULY 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 587 137535 14761 428201 1516043
AUG 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 1281 52585 33077 780893 1334730
AUG 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 793 172592 9305 403799 409251
SEP 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 1139 192247 56147 620571 2026292
SEP 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 685 111149 28867 572037 1471869
OCT 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 1050 167308 12255 585990 556248
OCT 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 1033 92203 17121 577741 1151765
NOV 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 864 132284 3196 582650 2321728
NOV 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 628 116531 6732 686925 540180
DEC 1995 CH-46E MAG-26 940 136843 22795 639277 777406
DEC 1995 CH-46E MAG-29 545 70127 11253 646303 557124
JAN 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 1208 280334 13243 506227 1945556
JAN 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 558 116519 5905 599190 871217
FEB 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 1197 199817 23449 702896 1023028
FEB 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 517 106151 47843 472365 839387
MAR 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 1115 210987 9221 820383 1324533
MAR 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 379 96052 5598 397334 841631
APR 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 1371 223252 38171 938114 1540409
APR 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 385 81100 16381 402667 319683
MAY 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 1204 228566 35816 1086791 1273448
MAY 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 572 150163 83511 477502 275626
JUNE 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 888 198060 29974 1149189 1022916
JUNE 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 544 140922 14735 369643 641271
JULY 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 934 149368 26923 964918 1376441
JULY 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 456 -16916 6699 324496 321826
AUG 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 725 236026 1605 509946 1527504
AUG 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 529 74914 27268 687287 906193
SEP 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 550 155026 34917 367879 855815
SEP 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 607 44587 24150 402673 205144
OCT 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 816 158139 10328 715128 975641
OCT 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 854 91822 74580 586577 943427
NOV 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 605 113686 39388 468210 1019091
NOV 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 425 61145 30499 547967 350577
DEC 1996 CH-46E MAG-26 611 89294 43829 694192 844359
DEC 1996 CH-46E MAG-29 278 52193 4955 405991 1086519
JAN 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 895 116146 31365 1260397 791328
JAN 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 285 80941 39086 429799 723356
FEB 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 1080 139930 40303 778371 1368767
99
FEB 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 271 78490 27498 417024 389220
MAR 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 1287 164011 57049 933377 871682
MAR 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 353 68736 7448 348061 134945
APR 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 1124 151110 14875 740688 1869241
APR 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 416 141313 23812 492918 877795
MAY 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 1114 168676 28872 956747 1339829
MAY 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 314 26022 -12464 607564 139507
JUNE 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 669 195163 18782 623163 837449
JUNE 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 439 79937 40500 414629 308764
JULY 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 919 109717 26029 675904 370168
JULY 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 521 90402 -16065 327993 -375610
AUG 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 767 214864 27528 529991 862643
AUG 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 587 63877 57104 593906 537923
SEP 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 711 201395 3151 619985 2014916
SEP 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 520 68119 21549 408105 1152809
OCT 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 1082 191613 9122 1152071 2402194
OCT 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 478 108396 25038 753545 1916995
NOV 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 696 113074 31214 565562 1944924
NOV 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 295 87154 3971 517601 1126645
DEC 1997 CH-46E MAG-26 1123 125932 41420 869721 1154964
DEC 1997 CH-46E MAG-29 363 95918 32697 417047 987830
JAN 1998 CH-46E MAG-26 956 145818 15391 1288988 1116573
JAN 1998 CH-46E MAG-29 436 106718 42389 570299 1424994
FEB 1998 CH-46E MAG-26 769 122515 59428 751804 2162917
FEB 1998 CH-46E MAG-29 551 94319 18003 433976 32937
MAR 1998 CH-46E MAG-26 1031 242877 30854 1072992 869249
MAR 1998 CH-46E MAG-29 605 135979 28943 563054 728370
APR 1998 CH-46E MAG-26 812 180639 32139 1473656 1261701
APR 1998 CH-46E MAG-29 658 115095 14744 793044 1924689
MAY 1998 CH-46E MAG-26 748 169509 37238 545120 296566
MAY 1998 CH-46E MAG-29 632 134939 13303 300135 936690
JUNE 1998 CH-46E MAG-26 1032 202401 19231 1321807 -218078
JUNE 1998 CH-46E MAG-29 625 113884 40016 223371 -290636
JULY 1998 CH-46E MAG-26 1059 200909 43143 648710 1277864
JULY 1998 CH-46E MAG-29 373 101736 35557 136801 285471
AUG 1998 CH-46E MAG-26 1147 168733 29129 294446 1761890
AUG 1998 CH-46E MAG-29 504 115140 4430 256542 631142
SEP 1998 CH-46E MAG-32 1034 220862 34005 524069 1106591
SEP 1998 CH-46E MAG-35 276 61911 61438 553765 726287
F-18 Flight Hour and Cost Data
(in nominal $)
MON YEAR TYPE UNIT HOURS 7B (FUEL) 7F (FLT E) 7L (AFM) 9S(DLR)
NOV 1993 FA-18A MAG-31 1162 2506691 2058 813031 2894814
NOV 1993 FA-18C MAG-31 411 719771 1125 174275 451516
NOV 1993 FA-18D MAG-31 756 583770 306 170874 174123
DEC 1993 FA-18A MAG-31 808 950869 6323 1077021 2932469
DEC 1993 FA-18C MAG-31 379 367839 1419 180241 414211
DEC 1993 FA-18D MAG-31 775 531433 7200 160592 226821
JAN 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 901 1008917 5087 971313 2354210
100
JAN 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 484 496490 875 52286 102435
JAN 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 642 515676 3499 146538 283517
FEB 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 1497 1462849 15142 369307 1243901
FEB 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 491 446189 1566 288624 619728
FEB 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 857 715164 8898 136855 103831
MAR 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 1961 1696369 3959 1155956 2492231
MAR 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 599 359446 1452 450761 986074
MAR 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 783 759491 7521 241015 242754
APR 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 1351 1536665 18774 824043 3062658
APR 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 513 627782 236 261331 823554
APR 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 891 417217 1196 212020 171864
MAY 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 873 1429940 5621 1032351 2936628
MAY 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 751 741656 42 76543 56191
MAY 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 1327 943462 3479 272430 506338
JUNE 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 731 1115711 15258 744120 2970793
JUNE 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 899 663141 1866 119031 296519
JUNE 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 1240 728939 6809 1 73348 161375
JULY 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 953 971429 -165 458607 208231
1
JULY 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 671 842317 3765 25741
1
740258
JULY 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 1100 842615 3641 287965 594624
AUG 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 587 1293236 11672 544162 929752
AUG 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 715 995208 7156 667018 1606162
AUG 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 1302 1225958 10587 259501 487030
SEP 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 114 281978 7202 256272 1904281
SEP 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 428 689148 2223 47496 476265
SEP 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 796 269638 -232 113230 326909
OCT 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 842 873832 2363 326313 808899
OCT 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 995 509585 17126 339841 1003447
OCT 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 1132 479736 4019 249261 523548
NOV 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 639 540111 13667 462439 1971258
NOV 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 1001 657858 23808 153716 403068
NOV 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 1013 388363 1844 287363 747868
DEC 1994 FA-18A MAG-31 608 568401 2210 390814 1813848
DEC 1994 FA-18C MAG-31 699 572118 2899 98958 158686
DEC 1994 FA-18D MAG-31 1084 1072830 4191 258773 898443
JAN 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 600 1610575 13544 638241 1872909
JAN 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 920 1275945 6894 350466 708873
JAN 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1310 1340479 15702 582599 242129
FEB 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 781 259127 5967 487855 2294076
FEB 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 888 779840 14737 363284 717774
FEB 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1414 769416 141 234843 423306
MAR 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 976 833323 6815 13951 -2679896
MAR 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 754 430605 7753 709945 2454576
MAR 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1393 841485 6242 1224773 4665075
APR 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 811 1251415 10225 2712907 9973412
APR 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 482 968478 4221 92117 -938899
APR 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1186 1 1 1 5680 5966 -1112551 -5139444
MAY 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 946 1198732 2110 901089 759375
MAY 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 502 866389 8018 227376 241820
MAY 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1369 1359399 17978 259943 152360
101
JUNE 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 770 818140 5218 1228487 1477478
JUNE 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 438 953349 9469 110766 137904
JUNE 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1463 1 079584 3384 385237 293854
JULY 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 780 1094618 2926 640596 1653249
JULY 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 611 1035375 10001 332950 245161
JULY 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1286 1058677 4442 332947 686370
AUG 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 806 1242122 3196 930880 2539158
AUG 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 428 1212696 4766 133406 226816
AUG 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1330 1269107 9711 325047 766878
SEP 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 739 1036497 43531 553991 1878947
SEP 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 60 618634 14320 55686 145127
SEP 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1406 933587 9637 509717 551023
OCT 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 813 1076946 7818 1239105 1612047
OCT 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 240 609863 2989 304649 305004
OCT 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1422 1289563 19389 492354 741977
NOV 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 652 712164 6848 480968 825123
NOV 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 369 991735 10594 87057 216663
NOV 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1085 878424 -7408 230692 179416
DEC 1995 FA-18A MAG-31 714 831105 6570 188327 2286138
DEC 1995 FA-18C MAG-31 260 849102 620 278137 553391
DEC 1995 FA-18D MAG-31 1279 1016255 26031 557148 712252
JAN 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 659 675752 6584 1443715 1473691
JAN 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 231 670366 2957 905108 1003360
JAN 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 1278 1660585 11917 1431605 948755
FEB 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 758 549783 4463 453921 1337785
FEB 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 446 831691 406312 771075
FEB 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 1429 425892 12639 512872 386756
MAR 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 588 1195222 15756 1225499 2148441
MAR 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 588 631402 30760 541707 932864
MAR 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 1156 909445 1016 507015 459969
APR 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 961 1224139 4777 1220074 1561598
APR 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 812 771486 4037 -439513 -615474
APR 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 1263 1379456 1034 1296326 1350450
MAY 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 958 2262395 3209 1330647 2547474
MAY 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 744 656173 1786 512473 733415
MAY 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 1113 670653 526 753329 1042063
JUNE 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 618 -647665 1795 895072 1340477
JUNE 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 695 640839 7496 430014 336937
JUNE 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 1242 1059081 6227 844256 510437
JULY 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 758 1165671 3358 1225190 2384566
JULY 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 634 526385 3222 492966 598099
JULY 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 1027 850262 18447 565210 1055588
AUG 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 658 727523 -605 1 369939 1694212
AUG 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 1117 915875 4805 409983 555870
AUG 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 977 835527 11914 639555 1037996
SEP 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 448 1226220 13532 372246 1463997
SEP 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 514 620220 5472 318799 500012
SEP 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 841 587745 -17082 479932 899395
OCT 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 526 706483 10509 626999 1301739
OCT 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 917 800509 13419 424457 495127
102
OCT 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 1048 867384 4818 588118 533100
NOV 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 411 720370 3604 570311 979628
NOV 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 474 443332 10390 357911 653111
NOV 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 768 661082 9522 570954 870930
DEC 1996 FA-18A MAG-31 357 475787 2614 876108 806275
DEC 1996 FA-18C MAG-31 275 532510 15884 520689 305929
DEC 1996 FA-18D MAG-31 785 731936 11981 949425 732076
JAN 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 174 345463 -418 1418468 2249258
JAN 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 400 754905 10089 678059 547471
JAN 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 983 859810 230362 989456 998384
FEB 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 259 493575 2513 869457 1485651
FEB 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 406 722812 15527 415111 573247
FEB 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 842 631201 -215187 688018 677859
MAR 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 429 577063 21831 343506 922261
MAR 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 429 699503 9485 148907 151992
MAR 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 1395 334897 6289 272721 678888
APR 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 388 534036 -7967 434072 1202595
APR 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 423 833249 5093 286026 509932
APR 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 1178 1705368 9039 887440 1681516
MAY 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 382 490493 5600 674408 725943
MAY 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 620 869814 15919 472112 591627
MAY 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 1213 893065 14046 866935 952733
JUNE 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 246 661085 1474 421316 1156521
JUNE 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 767 493726 1525 204520 316072
JUNE 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 847 683807 22401 420720 497390
JULY 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 412 501356 9963 411052 402693
JULY 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 589 646946 8093 378058 119114
JULY 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 935 985512 8868 509164 66914
AUG 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 629 509965 5615 374926 1050867
AUG 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 809 69681
1
15089 297022 333126
AUG 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 1020 832673 21457 576020 389043
SEP 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 576 631700 27255 643957 2530528
SEP 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 497 756691 24049 410690 744938
SEP 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 930 1053437 16686 1002629 1820337
OCT 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 945 898731 1786 874981 5020915
OCT 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 356 878903 3869 307902 897718
OCT 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 1096 1160928 6967 733976 1488200
NOV 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 442 468814 7784 1 029022 3447526
NOV 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 166 677667 5362 415248 944734
NOV 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 704 754966 6221 825916 1548756
DEC 1997 FA-18A MAG-31 609 576960 11518 1846555 2245952
DEC 1997 FA-18C MAG-31 197 681787 15378 404386 572629
DEC 1997 FA-18D MAG-31 980 773665 1255 791919 1077290
JAN 1998 FA-18A MAG-31 755 774737 1057 843136 2321225
JAN 1998 FA-18C MAG-31 224 502066 16622 421376 1112200
JAN 1998 FA-18D MAG-31 1081 1076945 10681 854492 1778130
FEB 1998 FA-18A MAG-31 382 786954 9164 857341 2436872
FEB 1998 FA-18C MAG-31 232 720529 5120 396266 1154819
FEB 1998 FA-18D MAG-31 1092 1251342 8516 770519 2291589
MAR 1998 FA-18A MAG-31 406 990358 6361 668281 1 744423
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MAR 1998 FA-18C MAG-31 314 370478 9542 537497 524983
MAR 1998 FA-18D MAG-31 1123 910855 11871 1015206 2723376
APR 1998 FA-18A MAG-31 391 865086 9078 1121603 1908746
APR 1998 FA-18C MAG-31 439 583694 7460 516840 938875
APR 1998 FA-18D MAG-31 955 1147110 10381 754105 1414732
MAY 1998 FA-18A MAG-31 379 1012366 7372 756272 1585512
MAY 1998 FA-18C MAG-31 595 809032 16472 393638 602565
MAY 1998 FA-18D MAG-31 1021 1141810 17018 516849 945277
JUNE 1998 FA-18A MAG-31 193 448154 1536 821222 2320329
JUNE 1998 FA-18C MAG-31 664 687775 9502 481224 1092614
JUNE 1998 FA-18D MAG-31 1059 1368378 4034 562439 1418457
JULY 1998 FA-18A MAG-31 172 652947 17313 708065 1871424
JULY 1998 FA-18C MAG-31 824 784076 6817 547155 1116463
JULY 1998 FA-18D MAG-31 960 1295254 12499 705944 1684354
AUG 1998 FA-18A MAG-31 335 862857 4068 903044 1396578
AUG 1998 FA-18C MAG-31 961 991255 9218 540985 300644
AUG 1998 FA-18D MAG-31 1104 933480 3411 887902 842186
SEP 1998 FA-18A MAG-31 367 871815 17749 507358 2723016
SEP 1998 FA-18C MAG-31 885 693068 26730 314055 849442
SEP 1998 FA-18D MAG-31 704 1397114 27576 386546 528382
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APPENDIX C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS TABLES
Regression Results from AIRLANT Annual Flying Hour Cost
Reports
AIRLANT Regression Results (FY 95-
98)
(Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y A T P b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -33032 -0.76 0.52 0.6975 7.46 0.02 96.5% 94.8% 55.72 0.01 5843
AFM v. Hours 394498 1.36 0.31 -0.1202 -0.19 0.86 1.8% 0.5% 0.03 0.86 39474
DLR v. Hours 830318 2.19 0.16 -0.2237 -0.27 0.81 3.6% 0.4% 0.07 0.81 51677
Totl v. Hours 1191783 3.61 0.07 0.35 0.49 0.67 10.6% 0.3% 0.24 0.67 44967
Regression Formula for Fuel Cost (in $1000s) = .6975(HOURS)
Marine TACAIR Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y A T P b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -17319 -1.63 0.24 0.8083 7.54 0.02 96.6% 94.9% 56.83 0.02 3393
AFM v. Hours 91502 1.82 0.21 0.03 0.06 0.96 0.0% 0.5% 0.96 15998
DLR v. Hours 121055 2.19 0.16 0.4645 0.83 0.49 25.6% 0.1% 0.69 0.49 17665
Totl v. Hours 121055 2.19 0.16 2.4645 4.4 0.05 90.6% 85.9% 19.38 0.047 17665
Regression Formula for Fuel Cost (in $1000s) = ,8083(HOURS)
Regression Formula for Total Cost (in $1000s) = 2.4645(HOURS)
Marine Fleet Air Training Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of
$)
Xv.Y A T P b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -11464 -0.51 0.66 1.1566 0.86 0.48 27.3% 0.1% 0.75 0.48 1319
AFM v. Hours -9343 -0.18 0.87 1.314 0.43 0.71 8.4% 0.4% 0.18 0.71 3031
DLR v. Hours 39097 0.5 0.66 -0.9563 0.2 0.86 2.0% 0.5% 0.04 0.86 4636
Totl v. Hours 18269 0.16 0.88 1.5144 0.23 0.84 2.6% 0.5% 0.05 0.84 6485
Marine AV-8B Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv.Y A T P b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -1099 -1.85
AFM v. Hours 18406.58 15.88
DLR v. Hours 33148 20.41
Totl v. Hours 50455 16.83
0.21 0.7229 16.17 0.00 99.2% 98.8% 261 0.004 289.2504
0.00 -0.3242 -3.71 0.07 87.3% 80.9% 13.78 0.065 564.8663
0.00 -0.1136 -0.92 0.45 30.1% 0.0% 0.861 0451 791.6548
0.00 0.2851 1.26 0.33 44.3% 16.5% 1.59 0.334 1461.143
Regression Formula for Fuel Cost (in $1000s) = 72294(HOURS)
Marine CH-46E Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv.Y A T P b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -897.412 -1.43 0.29 0.2241 6.35 0.02 95.2% 92.9% 40.26 0.024 171.272
AFM v. Hours 19399.31 3.38 0.08 -0.016 -0.049 0.67 32.8% 10.8% 0.241 0.671 1577.395
DLR v. Hours 7124.784 0.98 0.43 1.0537 2.57 0.12 76.8% 65.3% 6.642 0.123 1982.576
Totl v. Hours 25626.69 7.1 0.02 1.118 5.46 0.03 93.7% 90.6% 29.87 0.032 991.9605
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Regression Formula for Fuel Cost (in $1000s) = .2241 (HOURS)
Regression Formula for Total Cost (in $1000s) = 25626.69 + 1 .1 18(HOURS)
Marine CH-53E Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y a T P b T P R2 Adj R2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -561.752 -0.49 0.67 0.5128 3.01 0.09 90.5% 81.9% 9.079 0.094 198.351
AFM v. Hours 21309.76 2.89 0.10 -1.7075 -1.56 0.26 54.9% 32.3% 2.43 0.258 1274.724
DLR v. Hours 2886.073 0.15 0.89 2.4504 0.862 0.48 27.1% 0.1% 0.744 0.479 3310.643
Totl v. Hours 23634 0.93 0.45 1.2557 0.332 0.77 5.2% 0.4% 0.11 0.77 4395.181
Alternative
Fuel v Hours -69.9223 -0.1 0.92 0.438 4.38 0.01 79.3% 75.4% 19.18 0.007 160.3032
(FY92-FY98)
Regression Formula for Fuel Cost (in $1000s) = .437968(HOURS)
Marine F-18(AII models) Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y a T P b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -1038.61 -1.15 0.28 1.11 14.05 0.00 95.1% 94.6% 197 647.8103
AFM v. Hours 5296.868 0.79 0.45 0.4192 0.712 0.49 4.8% 0.0% 0.5 0.492 4820.494
DLR v. Hours 14329.77 1.21 0.26 0.3627 0.35 0.73 1.1% 0.0% 0.121 0.735 8537.386
Totl v. Hours 18588.02 1.069 0.31 1.8919 1.24 0.24 13.3% 4.6% 1.53 0.243 12507.41
Regression Formula for Fuel Cost (in $1 000s) =1.11 (HOURS)
Marine F-18A Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y a T P b T P R2 Adj R2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -2556 -2.74 0.11 1.2056 14.87 0.00 99.1% 98.6% 221.07 0.004 434.0637
AFM v. Hours 12616 0.83 0.49 0.1477 0.11 0.92 0.0% 0.0% 0.01 0.92 7045.47
DLR v. Hours 31950 1.85 0.20 -0.3774 -0.25 0.82 3.0% 0.4% 0.06 0.82 8025.368
Totl v. Hours 42010 1.32 0.31 0.976 0.35 0.76 5.9% 0.0% 0.12 0.756 14743
Regression Formula for Fuel Cost (in $1000s) = 1.2056(HOURS)
Marine F-18C Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y a T P b T P R2 Adj R2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -3387 -1.21 0.32 1.4138 5.15 0.04 92.9% 89.4% 26.53 0.035 678.58
AFM v. Hours 3059 0.77 0.52 0.3339 0.8 0.51 24.4% 0.0% 0.64 0.51 1027
DLR v. Hours 3453 0.31 0.78 0.9802 0.84 0.48 26.3% 0.0% 0.71 0.48 2863
Totl v. Hours 3125 0.26 0.82 2.7278 2.2 0.15 70.9% 56.3% 4.87 0.16 3055
Regression Formula for Fuel Cost (in $1000s) = 1.4138(HOURS)
Marine F-18D Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv. Y a T P b T P R2 Adj R2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -531 -0.61 0.60 1.0641 15.83 0.00 99.2% 98.8% 250.7 0.003 218.1885
AFM v. Hours 9387 1.04 0.40 0.0023 0.003 0.99 0.0% 0.0% 1.04 0.99 2262
DLR v. Hours -3575 0.24 0.83 1 .4247 1.23 0.34 43.3% 14.9% 1.52 0.341 3743
Totl v. Hours 5280 0.355 0.75 2.491 2.16 0.16 70.0% 55.0% 4.67 0.16 3740
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Regression Formula for Fuel Cost (in $1000s) = 1.0641 (HOURS)
Regression Results from 2nd MAW DOLARS Monthly Reports
F-18(AII models) Regression Results (FY 95-98- Monthly Data)
Xv. Y a T P b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se DW
Fuel v. Hours 606623 7.72 0.00 524.72 5.51 0.00 17.6% 17.0% 30.38 389873 1.56
Fit E. v. Hours 7015 1.24 0.21 2.648 0.39 0.70 0.1% 0.0% 0.15 0.699 27983 2.07
AFM v. Hours 567260 608 6.80 37.1 0.37 0.71 0.1% 0.0% 0.13 0.714 413934 1.82
DLR v. Hours 1402135 5.04 0.00 -232.8 -0.69 0.49 0.3% 0.0% 0.48 0.49 1379534 1.83
Totl v. Hours 2583034 7.14 0.00 331.4 0.76 0.45 0.4% 0.0% 0.57 0.451 1796071 1.88
Regression Formula for Fuel would only account for 17% of Relationship
CH-46E Regression Results (FY 95-98 -
Monthly Data)
Xv. Y a T P b T P R2 AdjR2 F P Se DW
Fuel v. Hours 30278 1.89 0.06 174.1 8.98 0.00 46.2% 45.6% 80.62 57381 2.31
Fit E. v. Hours 15963 3.03 0.00 13.243 2.08 0.04 4.4% 3.4% 4.32 0.04 18862 1.91
AFM v. Hours 306356 4.58 0.00 530.98 6.56 0.00 31.4% 30.7% 43.04 239501 1.73
DLR v. Hours 409411 2.58 0.01 919.6 4.79 0.00 19.6% 18.8% 22.95 567993 1.7
Totl v. Hours 762009 4.22 0.00 1637.9 7.49 0.00 37.4% 36.7% 56.06 647351 1.58
Regression Formulas would only account for less than 50% of relationship
AV-8B Regression Results (FY 95-98 -
Monthly Data)




































































































Regression Formulas would only account for 30% of Flight Hour relationships or less.
Marine Forces Pacific TACAIR Regression Results from AIRPAC OP-20 History Finals
MFPAC TACAIR Regression Results (FY 95-98) (Intercepts in 1000s of $)
Xv.Y a T P b T P R2 Adj R2 F P Se
Fuel v. Hours -24582 -2.63 0.12 0.6414 10.22 0.01 98.1% 97.1% 104.51 0.009 1761.674
AFM v. Hours 136902 9.84 0.01 -0.0121 -1.28 0.33 45.0% 17.5% 1.63 0.328 2664.3
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DLR v. Hours 244084 8.67 0.01 -0.1725 -0.89 0.46 28.7% 0.0% 0.8 0.463 5392.456
Totl v. Hours 356405 21.75 0.00 0.3474 3.1 0.09 82.8% 74.2% 9.66 0.089 3138.82
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